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Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be
enforced (High Command Case)
I.

Introduction
Diplomatic law concerns the establishment of diplomatic relations between States,

including both temporary and permanent missions, and the establishment of such relations. It
also concerns the role of the members of the staff of foreign missions (MSM) and the privileges
and immunities to be afforded to such individuals in the receiving States. Its history has largely
been part of customary international law, stretching back more than two millennia. Customary
international law, sometimes referred to as the Law of Nations, is the corpus of legal norms that
States have developed in their relations with one another. Diplomatic law became internationally
codified only when the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) opened for
signatures in 1961 and came into force three years later.
Violations of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 have recently
incurred individual criminal responsibility even though it does not possess a penal provision.
The same is true with the VCDR in that it does not have a penal provision. Therefore, it seems
reasonable that the VCDR may similarly incur individual criminal responsibility.
A. Scope
This memorandum surveys the possibility of holding individuals criminally liable under
the VCDR as stipulated under Article 8 and Article 29 of the Law on the Establishment of the
Extraordinary Chambers (ECCC Statute).* The ECCC Statute has a temporal jurisdiction
covering the period of April 17, 1975 to January 6, 1979 as stated in Article 1.1
*

“Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, relation to ECCC law: to what extent is there individual
criminal responsibility for violations of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) under
Article 8 and 29 of the ECCC law? If liability exists, what are the elements of such crimes?” Email from
Alexander Bates, Senior Assistant Prosecutor for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,
(Oct. 1, 2007) (on file with author), [hereinafter 01 Oct 2007 Email from Alexander Bates] “Re the
Article 8 charges, it's actually quite a tricky question for us, factually. I've asked Craig, our resident expert
on all things DK, and he says he knows of no foreign diplomats who were killed by the KR during our
period of personal jurisdiction. He asked the following questions in response to my email:
1) Are diplomats protected from unreasonable detention, as when the entire remaining diplomatic

1

Colin Nisbet
War Crimes Lab Fall 2007
Article 8 of the ECCC Statute reads:
The Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to bring to trial all Suspects
most responsible for crimes against internationally protected persons pursuant to
the Vienna Convention of 1961 on Diplomatic Relations, and which were
committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.2
Article 29 of the ECCC Statute reads:
Any Suspect who planned, instigated, ordered, aided and abetted, or committed
the crimes referred to in Article 3 new, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this law shall be
individually responsible for the crime.
The position or rank of any Suspect shall not relieve such person of criminal
responsibility or mitigate punishment.
The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 3 new, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this
law were committed by a subordinate does not relieve the superior of personal
criminal responsibility if the superior had effective command and control or
authority and control over the subordinate, and the superior knew or had reason to
know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts
or to punish the perpetrators.
The fact that a Suspect acted pursuant to an order of the Government of
Democratic Kampuchea or of a superior shall not relieve the Suspect of individual
criminal responsibility.3
Articles 3 new through 8 cover the temporal jurisdiction of 17 July 1975 through 6 January 1979
for commissions of crimes described therein. Article 3 refers to the commission of crimes set

community was confined to the French embassy for several weeks after April 17, 1975?
2) Are family members of diplomats protected, as in the cases where Khmer spouses of foreign
diplomats were ordered out [of] the French embassy and never seen again?
3) Are Cambodian diplomats protected, as when they were recalled from abroad and ended up at S21?
4) Is the official and personal property of diplomats protected, as when most or all embassies were
breached after April 17th, and any personal items not carried off to the French embassy was never
seen again?” [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 at Tab 68]
1

Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of
amendments as promulgated on 27 October 2004, art. 1, available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/law/4/KR_Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf (last visited
on 24 November 2007) [hereinafter ECCC Statute]. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 4 at Tab
62].

2

Id. at art. 8.

3

Id. at art. 29.

2
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forth in the Cambodia 1956 Penal Code. Article 4 refers to the crime of genocide. Article 5
refers to crimes against humanity. Article 6 refers to the commission of grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Article 7 refers to the destruction of cultural property
during armed conflict pursuant to the 1954 Hague Convention for Protection of Cultural Property
in the Event of Armed Conflict.4
This memorandum will cover the following:
(1) The FACTUAL BACKGROUND discusses the history of customary diplomatic law up
to the middle of the 20th century; the International Law Commission’s drafting of the
articles of the VCDR; the opening of and entry into force of the VCDR, to which
Cambodia acceded in 1965;5 and subsequent treaties concerning diplomatic law.
(2) The LEGAL ANALYSIS discusses the possibility of individual criminal liability for
violations of the VCDR. This section will also focus on drawing an analogy between
recent applications of Common Article 36 to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949.
4

This memorandum will not cover violations under either Article 4 or 7 of the ECCC Statute as they are
outside the scope of this memorandum.

5

Eileen Denza, Diplomatic Law: A Commentary on the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations
437 (2nd ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1998). [Hereinafter Commentary on VCDR] [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 21].

6

International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949:
Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field 37 – 38 (Jean Pictet, ed., International Committee of the Red Cross 1952). [Hereinafter
Commentary to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949]. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4
at Tab 77].
“In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the
High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following
provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid
down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other
cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on
race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth, or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and
in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;

3
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This analogy will focus on the fact that while Common Article 3 had no penal provision,
the ICTY still succeeded in prosecuting several individuals for such violations.
Additionally, this section also illustrates that these successful prosecutions were possible
only because Common Article 3 violations already entailed criminal liability in
customary international law prior to the ICTY’s first successful criminal prosecution of
such violations. Furthermore, this section will argue that this was true for violations of
the VCDR prior to 1975 and remains true today. The legal analysis will also consider
these central arguments and the counterarguments for individual criminal responsibility
for VCDR violations. Finally, this section will present an ELEMENTS subsection,
assuming arguendo that violations of the VCDR can incur criminal responsibility,
discussing the elements of individual criminal liability for such violations.
(3) The ALTERNATIVES TO PROSECUTION FOR CRIMES AS VIOLATIONS OF
THE VCDR will provide the Co-Prosecutor for other avenues of indicting Suspects for
crimes that violate the VCDR.
(4) The PRACTICAL APPLICATION section applies the above arguments and elements
of violations of the VCDR to four specific questions that the Co-Prosecutor of the ECCC
posed, determining whether he may prosecute for individual criminal liability in each
situation.
B. Summary of Conclusions
i.

Cambodia was bound by the VCDR during the temporal
jurisdiction of the ECCC.

(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer
its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the
conflict. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10]

4
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The United Nations opened the VCDR for signatures in Vienna on 18 April 1961.7 This
included two Optional Protocols to the VCDR.8 The VCDR did not enter into force until three
years later.9 Cambodia acceded to the VCDR and its two Optional Protocols on 31 August
1965.10 This is relevant because Cambodia’s accession to the VCDR in 1965 bound the
Democratic Kampuchea (DK) government regardless of whether they recognized international
law.11 The temporal jurisdiction of the ECCC gives the Chambers the competence to prosecute
for crimes, which started occurring on April 17, 1975 through January 6, 1979.12 In particular,
Article 8 of the ECCC Statute gives the ECCC competence to prosecute individuals most
responsible for crimes against internationally protected persons pursuant to the VCDR during the
period of the temporal jurisdiction of the ECCC.13
ii.

Holding individuals criminally liable for violations of the VCDR is a
legal novelty. There is no precedent wherein an individual has been
held criminally liable for such. However, precedent is found in
Common Article 3, wherein individual criminal liability was not
envisioned now is the basis for such liability.

7

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Optional Protocol concerning Acquisition of Nationality
[hereinafter Optional Protocol concerning Acquisition of Nationality] [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook 1 at Tab 2], cited in Denza, Commentary on the VCDR supra note 5 at 412 – 13. [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 21].
8

Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations Optional Protocol concerning the compulsory Settlement
of Disputes [hereinafter Optional Protocol concerning the compulsory Settlement of Disputes]
[hereinafter Optional Protocol II to the VCDR] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 3],,
cited in Denza, Commentary on the VCDR supra note 5 at 416 – 19. [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook 1 at Tab 21].

9

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. [hereinafter VCDR]
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 1]

10

Denza, Supra note 5, at 437, 441, and 443. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 21].

11

Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ala. 1982). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 31].
12

ECCC Statute supra note 1, art. 1. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 at Tab 62].

13

Id. art 8.

5

Colin Nisbet
War Crimes Lab Fall 2007
Cambodia adopted the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes to the VCDR on 31 August 1965.14 This Optional Protocol allows for the settlement of
disputes via either an arbitral tribunal or the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The VCDR
makes no mention of criminal liability for individuals who violate the Convention. While this
Optional Protocol does not specifically allow for individual criminal responsibility, it need not
necessarily refuse to do so. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 was not
originally envisioned to entail such responsibility since it did not pertain to international conflicts
but only internal ones.15 However, courts have upheld criminal responsibility for breaches of
Common Article 3 beginning with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) in Prosecutor v. Tadić (Tadić Case)16 even though Common Article 3 was not originally
envisioned to have entailed such liability. Therefore, the fact that neither the VCDR nor the
compulsory Settlement of Disputes has any specific penal provisions does not preclude the
possibility of prosecuting individuals for criminal liability when they have violated the VCDR.
iii.

If it is possible to hold an individual criminally responsible for
violations of the VCDR, then elements must be established.

Assuming arguendo, that violations of the VCDR may incur individual criminal liability,
then elements must be established to determine if any given violation against the VCDR may
result in such liability. The Elements of the Crime as set out in the Rome Statute (ICC Statute)
for the International Criminal Court (ICC) should be the controlling authority since the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have used the ICC Statute for guidance.17
14

Denza, supra note 5, at 443 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 21].

15

Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 6, art. 3. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook 4 at Tab 77].

16

Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1--T, Opinion and Judgment (May 7, 1997) [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 42].

17

William Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and
Sierra Leone 219 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006).
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iv.

Some of the situations specified in the four specific questions
constitute violations of the VCDR

ECCC Co-Prosecutor, Alex Bates, has posed four specific questions in addition to the
general inquiry, which is primary focus of this inquiry. Each of these questions asks whether the
given situation constitutes a breach of the VCDR. When the scenario does, either wholly or in
part, constitute a violation of the VCDR, the memorandum will discuss why and where legal
precedent exists, refer to cases before the ICJ that have analyzed such situations. Where the
situations cannot be said to be violations under the VCDR, then there will be a brief discussion
as to the remedy for such violations.
1. Question #1: Are diplomats protected from unreasonable
detention, as when the entire remaining diplomatic community
was confined to the French embassy for several weeks after
April 17, 1975?
Yes. Detention of diplomats goes against the notion of the inviolability of the diplomat’s
person, which is enshrined in Article 29 of the VCDR. All MSMs and private servants are
delineated in Article 1.18

18

VCDR, supra note, 9, art 1.

“(a) The “head of the mission” is the person charged by the sending State with the duty of acting in that
capacity;
(b) The “members of the mission” are the head of the mission and the members of the staff of the mission;
(c) The “members of the staff of the mission” are the members of the diplomatic staff, of the
administrative and technical staff and of the service staff of the mission;
(d) The “members of the diplomatic staff” are the members of the staff of the mission having diplomatic
rank;
(e) A “diplomatic agent” is the head of the mission or a member of the diplomatic staff of the mission;
(f) The “members of the administrative and technical staff” are the members of the staff of the mission
employed in the administrative and technical service of the mission;
(g) The “members of the service staff” are the members of the staff of the mission in the domestic service
of the mission;
(h) A “private servant” is a person who is in the domestic service of a member of the mission and who is
not an employee of the sending State;
(i) The “premises of the mission” are the buildings or parts of buildings and the land ancillary thereto,
irrespective of ownership, used for the purposes of the mission including the residence of the head of the
mission.” [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 1]
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2. Question #2: Are family members of diplomats protected, as in
the cases where Khmer spouses of foreign diplomats were
ordered out [of] the French embassy and never seen again?
Maybe. The VCDR Articles clearly delineate which family members the immunities and
privileges of specific MSMs extend. The VCDR does not possess a definition for who constitute
family members of the protected MSMs. However, it draws clear lines between status based on
the status of the MSM and the status of their family member. Article 37 of the VCDR clearly
divides between two groups of MSMs, diplomatic agents and junior staff of the mission, and
private servants.19 Article 37 also affords certain immunities and privileges to MSM family
members based on the status of the MSM. As regards family members who are permanent
residents of the receiving State, only those who are family members of a diplomatic agent will
receive the immunities and privileges the same as the diplomatic agent. Otherwise, the family
member who is a permanent resident of the receiving State does not receive these immunities
and privileges. Family members who are nationals of the receiving State do not obtain the
immunities and privileges of their MSM family member/spouse regardless of whether that
19

Id. art 37.

“1.The members of the family of a diplomatic agent forming part of his household shall, if they are
not nationals of the receiving State, enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in articles 29 to 36.
2.Members of the administrative and technical staff of the mission, together with members of
their families forming part of their respective households, shall, if they are not nationals of or
permanently resident in the receiving State, enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in articles 29
to 35, except that the immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving State specified
in paragraph 1 of article 31 shall not extend to acts performed outside the course of their duties. They
shall also enjoy the privileges specified in article 36, paragraph 1, in respect of articles imported at the
time of first installation.
3.Members of the service staff of the mission who are not nationals of or permanently resident in
the receiving State shall enjoy immunity in respect of acts performed in the course of their duties,
exemption from dues and taxes on the emoluments they receive by reason of their employment and the
exemption contained in article 33.
4.Private servants of members of the mission shall, if they are not nationals of or permanently
resident in the receiving State, be exempt from dues and taxes on the emoluments they receive by reason
of their employment. In other respects, they may enjoy privileges and immunities only to the extent
admitted by the receiving State. However, the receiving State must exercise its jurisdiction over those
persons in such a manner as not to interfere unduly with the performance of the functions of the mission.”
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person is a diplomatic agent or a junior staff member.
As for the spouses of diplomats serving in Cambodia at the time, if they were nationals of
Cambodia then their spouses’ immunities did not extend to them and they received no protection
under the VCDR.20 Any criminal prosecution for actions against such a class of people would
have to be considered under other instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR)21 and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture).22
3. Question #3: Are Cambodian diplomats protected, as when
they were recalled from abroad and ended up at S-21?
No. The Articles within the VCDR lay out what the immunities are as well as the
privileges of mission personnel of the sending State while in the receiving State. However, there
is no mention of what rights are to be afforded by the sending State to its diplomats while
performing their functions in the receiving State or upon recall by the sending State’s
government. While this sort of crime is not a violation of the VCDR, remedies may be available
under the ICCPR and the Torture Convention as mentioned in the short answer to question #2
above.
4. Question #4: Is the official and personal property of diplomats
protected, as when most or all embassies were breached after
April 17th, and any personal items not carried off to the
French embassy were never seen again?”
Yes. Like question #1, such a situation is explicitly stated as violating the VCDR. In this
case, the stipulations of several Articles, namely Articles 2223 and 30,24 are breached. Any

20

Id.

21

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (Dec. 16, 1966), G.A. Res. 220A (XXI).
Available at http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html.

22

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (Dec.
10, 1984) G.A. Res. 39/46.

23

Id., art 22.
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breach of the mission’s premises and/or confiscation of property within it constitute a violation
under the VCDR.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Diplomatic law existed as customary international law for more than two thousand years

before the United Nations opened the VCDR for signatures in 1961. This section will briefly
discuss the history of customary diplomatic law leading up to 1961, the International Law
Commission’s (ILC) drafting of articles, the opening and entry into force of the VCDR, and
subsequent developments in international diplomatic law.
A. Customary Diplomatic Law up to Mid-20th Century
Most scholarly resources that cover issues relevant to diplomatic law open with the
observation that customary diplomatic law between city-states, nations, and empires, has its roots
in Antiquity25 and arguably is the oldest form of customary international law.26 From ancient

“1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them,
except with the consent of the head of the mission.
2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the
mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of ht mission or
impairment of its dignity.
3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of
the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution.”
24

Id. art 30.

“1. The private residence of a diplomatic agent shall enjoy the same inviolability and protection as the
premises of the mission.
2. His papers, correspondences and, except as provided in paragraph 3 of Article 31, his property, shall
likewise enjoy inviolability.”
25

B. Sen, A Diplomat’s Handbook of International Law and Practice 6 (3rd rev. ed., Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1988). [Hereinafter, Diplomat’s Handbook]. Sen comments that special missions between
the Greek city-states, by the 5th century B.C. had reached a level of formal diplomacy that would be
recognizable today. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 22]. See also Clifton E Wilson,
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities 2 (The University of Arizona Press, 1967), “The Greek city-states
also viewed diplomatic persons as the personification of the sovereignty of the sending state.”
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 23].
26

Id.
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times until the 15th century, missions between political powers were temporary ad hoc
missions.27 This was the practice not only in Europe but also amongst the Hebrew kings, Asian
states, and Islamic states in western Asia.28 Thus, this form of diplomacy was not specific to one
group of people but a common notion amongst a wide-range of cultural, religious, and historical
traditions. Beginning in the 15th century in the Republic of Venice, permanent missions between
European courts began to flourish. After the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 “the establishment of
permanent diplomatic missions gradually became the common practice.”29 Grotius, commenting
on diplomatic law, wrote: “There are two maxims in the law of nations relating to ambassadors
which are generally accepted as established rules: The first is that ambassadors must be received
and the second that they must suffer no harm.”30 During the period of European colonization of
the Americas and Africa, most missions were still located in Europe and Turkey.31 The
revolutions and creation of new states in the Americas and, more recently, decolonization have
transformed diplomatic relations amongst States into a “universal application.”32
Professor Eileen Denza,33 one of the leading authorities on the VCDR, notes that by
1758, “the rules of law codified in the [VCDR] had long been stable” and would remain so for

27

Id., p. 6.

28

Id., pp. 3 – 5.

29

Id., p. 6.

30

GROTIUS, DE BELLI AC PACIS, BOOK II, CHAPTER XVIII [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook 1 at Tab 25]. Cited in Sen, supra note 26 at 6–7 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1
at Tab 22].

31

Sen supra note 25, at 7 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 22].

32

Id.

33

Eileen Denza – Biography, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/experts/academics.shtml?z_denza.
“Professor Eileen Denza is a former Legal Counsel to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Her book
Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is widely-recognised
as the leading work of authority in the field. She teaches on the Master’s course External Relations of the
EU, and Foreign Relations Law.” (emphasis in original) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 at Tab
73].

11

Colin Nisbet
War Crimes Lab Fall 2007
the next two centuries.34 Attempts at the multilateral codifying of diplomatic law have occurred
since at least the nineteenth century beginning with the Vienna Regulation of 1815.35 In 1952,
during its Seventh Session, the UN General Assembly asked that the International Law
Commission “to undertake the codifications of the topic “Diplomatic intercourse and
immunities,” and to treat it as a priority topic.”36 This started the process, which led to the
International Law Commission (ILC) beginning the task of drafting articles. The ILC’s efforts
resulted in the codification of diplomatic law and, ultimately, to the VCDR.
B. The International Law Commission and Development of the VCDR
Beginning with the Mandate37 at the end of 1952, the ILC began to set the foundation for
codifying diplomatic law. In 1956, the U.N. Secretariat for the 8th Session of the ILC prepared a
memorandum, whose purpose was “to present a broad outline of existing principles and rules and
the practice followed by States with regard to the immunities and privileges enjoyed by
diplomatic representatives of foreign States.”38 The Secretariat’s memorandum outlined the
previous attempts at codifying diplomatic law and the main concepts of immunity, and then
examined them and what aspects of these immunities remained controversial.39 The report
concluded that there existed a body of rules in this field of law “suitable for codification.”40

34

Denza, supra at note 5, at 1. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 21].

35

Subsequent attempts were “the Resolutions adopted by the Institute of International Law in 1895 and
1929, the Harvard Draft Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities of 1932.” Denza, supra
note 5, at 3 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 21].

36

G.A. Res. 685 (VII), U.N. Doc A/RES/685 (Dec. 5, 1952). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1
at Tab 9].

37

Id.

38

Codification of the International Law Relating to Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities Memorandum
prepared by the Secretariat, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/98 (Feb. 22, 1956). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook 1 at Tab 12].

39

Id. at ¶ 312.

40

Id. at ¶ 314.
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Beginning on 23 April 1957, during its ninth session, the ILC reviewed the “Diplomatic
Intercourse and Immunities Report by Mr. A.E.F. Sandström”41 as part of the agenda.42 The
Special Rapporteur then proposed further articles in 1958, “Diplomatic Intercourse and
Immunities – Revised draft articles proposed by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. A.E.F.
Sandström.”43 That same year, the ILC, having completed the draft articles, recommended that
they be submitted to Member States for commentary.44 The Report also included a section with
commentary on the settlement of disputes between States “concerning the interpretation and
application of this Convention that cannot be settled through diplomatic channels shall be
referred to conciliation or arbitration or, failing that, shall, at the request of either of the parties,
be submitted to the International Court of Justice.”45 At the 782nd plenary meeting of the
General Assembly (Thirteenth Session) on 5 December 1958, it invited Member States to submit
comments to the draft articles within six months46 and one year later, the UN General Assembly
called for an international conference in order to codify the rules of diplomacy.47
41

International Law Commission on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, 23 April to 28 June 1957
(ninth session), ¶ 12, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/91. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 13].
Reprinted in U.N. GAOR 12th Sess., Supplement No. 9 (A/3623). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook 1 at Tab 14].

42

Id.

43

Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities – Revised draft articles proposed by the Special Rapporteur,
Mr. A.E.F. Sandström, U.N. Docs A/CN.4/116/Add.1 (May 21, 1958) and A/CN.4/116/Add.2 (May 27,
1958). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 16]. Reprinted in II Yearbook of the
International Law Commission (1958) 16 – 20, U.N Docs. A/CN.4/116/Add.1 and 2. [Reproduced in
notebook 1 at Tab 17].

44

International Law Commission on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, A/3859 U.N. Docs
A/CN.4/117. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 18]. Reprinted in II Yearbook of the
International Law Commission (1958) ¶ 50. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 17]

45

Id. The Commentary deals with disagreement over whether a clause concerning dispute resolution
should have been placed within the draft and, if so, wherein and what form this clause should take.
“Others suggested that the clause should be included in a special protocol” which is what ultimately
occurred, manifested in the Optional Protocol of the compulsory Settlement of Disputes.

46

G.A. Res. 1288 (XIII) at 53 – 4, (Dec. 5, 1958). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 10].

47

G.A. Res. 1450 (XIV) at 55 – 6, (Dec. 7, 1959). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 11].
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The International Law Commission, when it was dealing with the matter of dispute
resolution seemed to focus solely on State Party resolution rather than trying to avail the
aggrieved party by allowing for the possibility of assigning individual criminal responsibility.
The reason why the violation of immunities would not be considered to entail such responsibility
is a matter of conjecture since the ILC did not address this particular possibility.
C. The VCDR: opened for signatories and entry into force
The UN Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities was in session for just
under six weeks, 2 March 1961 until 14 April 1961, when it finally adopted the VCDR and its
two Optional Protocols.48 With the United Nations opening the VCDR for signatures at Vienna
in 1961, finally, there was a multilateral codification of the law of diplomacy. However,
Professor Charles Chatterjee,49 points out, “[The VCDR and the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations] do not establish anything new about diplomatic missions or diplomats or consuls etc;
they simply codify the practice developed in the world of diplomacy and consular relations over
the centuries.”50 Even if this long transition were not seen as binding all nations to the VCDR,
Cambodia adopted the VCDR and its Optional Protocols concerning the adoption of nationality
and the settlement of disputes on 31 August 1965. Thus, Cambodia bound itself to the Articles
and Protocols of the VCDR beginning in 1965 and remained bound through the reign of the DK
government.51
The second Optional Protocol specifies two avenues Parties to a dispute can take in order
48

International Law Commission Analytical Guide: Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities,
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/guide/9_1.htm#bft1 (last visited Nov. 24, 2007). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook 4 at Tab 71].

49

Charles Chatterjee, International Law and Diplomacy at back cover (Routledge 2007) “Charles
Chatterjee is Professor of International Commercial and Criminal Law at London Metropolitan
University; his principal areas of interest are: public international law; international commercial law,
including banking; international commercial arbitration; and contract negotiation.” [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 24].

50

Id. at 35.

51

Moore, Digest of International Law 249, vol. 1 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 at Tab 79].
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to remedy any violation: arbitral tribunal or the International Court of Justice. There is no
mention of either criminal liability or individuals being held liable, whether civilly or criminally.
Thus, on its face, it appears that the short answer to the issue is that there is no path by which an
individual may be held criminally responsible for VCDR violations under Articles 8 and 29 of
the ECCC law because the VCDR explicitly provided for compulsory dispute resolution before
either an arbitral tribunal or the ICJ. However, the VCDR is the codification of the customary
international law at the time of its creation in Vienna in 1961 and customary international law is
not static but, usually, a constant progression and development of legal notions. Because there is
no penal provision in the VCDR its Optional Protocols does not preclude such a possibility.
There is legal precedent for this in the history of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions
of 1949. The memorandum will address this in the Legal Analysis.
D. Cambodia accedes to the VCDR and Problem of Succession of Governments
On 31 August 1965, Cambodia acceded to the VCDR. Even though the subsequent
decade would see the government change hands numerous times,52 the State of Cambodia was
still bound to the VCDR. Whether under the Lon Nol government or under the Khmer Rouge
regime or any other government, Cambodia had an obligation to act in good faith in regards the
VCDR. The notion of succession of government is that “[T]he traditional international law
theory has been that changes in the government or ideology of a state do not change the state or
affect its international obligations.”53 A case, which illustrates this best is Jackson v. People’s
Republic of China.54 This 1982 class action suit against the People’s Republic of China in order
52

Email from Craig Etcheson, Investigator, Office of the Co-Prosecutors, Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia. (Oct 23, 2007, 13:09:26 EST) (on file with author). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook 4 at Tab 69]. See also Steven Ratner, The Cambodia Settlement Agreements, 87 Am. J. Int’l L.
1 (1993). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 at 61.]
53

Barry E. Carter et al., International Law 449 (4th ed. Aspen, 2003). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook 2 at Tab 29].

54

Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ala. 1982).[Reproduced in
accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 31].
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“to recover the principal and interest on bearer bonds issued in 1911 by the Imperial Chinese
Government and sold in the United States.”55 The U.S. District Court stated, “changes in the
government or the internal policy of a state do not as a rule affect its position in international law
[…] though the government changes, the nation remains, with rights and obligations
unimpaired.”56 When Cambodia acceded to the VCDR in 1965, the subsequent governments had
to abide by the obligations of the VCDR. It is clear that the Khmer Rouge, under the
government of DK, did not. Thus, they violated the VCDR.
E. Subsequent Treaties concerning Diplomatic Agents
Codification of the customary international law of diplomacy did not end with the
VCDR. The United Nations opened the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) for
signatures in 1963.57 Ten years later, the United Nations, in order to combat the problem of
terrorism directed at diplomatic agents, opened the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomats (CPPC –
DA).58
i.

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations

The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) entered into force in 1967.59 In
the VCCR Preamble, the United Nations wrote that its Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse

55

Carter et al, supra note 53, at 449.

56

Moore, Digest of International Law 249, vol. 1. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 at Tab 78].
Also cited in Valley R. Co. v. State of Russia, 21 F.2d 396, 401 (2d Cir. 1927) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 32]. Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869 (N.D.
Ala. 1982). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 31]. Barry E. Carter et al., supra note 53, at
450. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 29].

57

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 2005. [Hereinafter
VCCR] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2]

58

Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons,
including Diplomats, Feb. 20, 1977, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter CPPC – DA] [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 4].

59

VCCR, supra note 57.
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and Immunities had already adopted the VCDR, and that the VCCR “would also contribute to
the development of friendly relations among nations, irrespective of their differing constitutional
and societal systems.”60 Article 70 of the VCCR provides for the “exercise of consular functions
by diplomatic missions”.61 The VCCR did not make any new forays into the notion of criminal
prosecutions for violations against MSMs.
ii.

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomats, (CPPC – DA) is a treaty that deals with attacks directed
against specifically internationally protected persons.62 The purpose of this Convention was to
build upon the inviolability of the diplomatic agent and the mission “by providing not only for
their protection but also by requiring parties to make punishable, by appropriate penalties, the
intentional commission of [those actions listed in Article 2(1)(a) of the CPPC – DA].”63 The
VCDR already obligated States Parties to it to provide for such protection.
The UN General Assembly requested “the ILC to consider the question of the protection
and inviolability of diplomatic agents and other persons entitled to protection under international
law.”64 The period of time following the VCDR and the VCCR entering into force witnessed
numerous attacks upon diplomatic personnel.65 Many instances occurred in which diplomats
were taken hostage, held for ransom, assassinated, or abused in a variety of other ways.66 In light
60

Id., Preamble.

61

Id. art. 70.

62

Id. Preamble

63

J. Craig Barker, The Protection of Diplomatic Personnel 6, (Ashgate 2006). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 27]. CPPC – DA, supra note 58, at art 2(1)(a). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 5].
64

Id.

65

Denza, supra note 5, at 212. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 21].
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of these events, the CPPC – DA was opened for signatures in 197367 and entered into force on 20
February 1977.68 Cambodia is not a Party to the CPPC – DA although it has stated that it intends
to accede to it in the future.69
Special attention needs to be paid to the fact that the CPPC – DA allows for criminal
liability as enshrined in Articles 2(3) and 3(3).70 Article 2(3) reads: Each State Party shall
make these crimes punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave
nature.”71 Article 3(3) reads: “This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction
exercised in accordance with internal law.”72 Article 373 of the CPPC – DA allows for states to
make the attempt to criminalize actions enshrined in Article 274 of the CPPPC – DA. The CPPC
– DA also describes the means by which States can settle disputes and this is enshrined in Article
13,75 of which the first paragraph is very similar to the VCDR Optional Protocol for the
compulsory Settlement of Disputes.
At first blush, the CPPC – DA seems to resolve, at least at the level of national law, the

66

Ludwik Dembinski, The Modern Law of Diplomacy: External Missions of States and International
Organizations 167 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1988). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab
26].
67

CPPC – DA, supra note 58, at Preamble [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 5]

68

Id.

69

Kingdom of Cambodia Ministry of Foreign Affair and International Cooperation – Cambodia Fights
Against Terrorism, (28 September 2001), http://www.mfaic.gov.kh/issuesdetail.php?contentid=88. (last
visited website on Nov. 24, 2007). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 at Tab 72].

70

CPPC – DA, supra note 58, at art. 2(3) and art 3(3). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab
5].

71

Id at art. 2(3).

72

Id at art. 3(3).

73

Id. at art. 3.

74

Id. at art. 2.

75

Id. at art. 13.
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obstacle of prosecuting individuals for actions contrary to diplomatic inviolability, whether
against a person or property. However, States have been reluctant to sign the CPPC – DA.76
Cambodia, although it has stated a willingness to do so, has yet to sign this treaty. Professor
Barker77 emphasizes a few reasons for this. First, Barker stated that there were ideological
divides “between older, more traditional states, which depended to a large extent on the existing
diplomatic processes, and the new states, who allegiance to the traditional methods of
international relations were minimal.”78 Barker supports this view with the evidence that of the
27 signatories to the CPPC – DA, 20 belonged to 17 European nations, the United States,
Canada, and Australia whereas only four Latin American nations, one African nation, and one
Asian nation signed the CPPC – DA.79 Barker also stated that one of the reasons for this divide
arose from “the conflict apparent during the negotiating of the OAS Convention surrounding the
question of asylum and the political offense exception to extradition.”80 The greatest problem,
according to Barker, was:
The first of these concerns the political nature of the offence in question and its
relationship to the vexed question of how to deal with terrorism. The second,
related, issue was the relative novelty of the system introduced by the Convention
based upon a development of international criminal law which was yet to receive
widespread support among the majority of states. A particular aspect of this
problem was the fact that the Convention imposed an obligation on states to
legislate internally to bring the duty to prosecute or extradite into their domestic
law.81
76

Barker, supra note 63, at 112. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 27].
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J. Craig Barker – Biography,
https://www.ashgate.com/shopping/title.asp?key1=&key2=&orig=results&isbn=0%207546%202352%20
1 (last visited on Nov. 24, 2007).
J. Craig Barker is Professor of Law and Director of Research in the Sussex Law School, University of
Sussex, UK. He teaches in the fields of public international law and international criminal law. His
primary research interest is the legal regulation of diplomatic relations and international immunities
generally. [Reproduced in notebook 4 at Tab 79].
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Barker, supra note 63, at 112. [Reproduced in notebook 1 at Tab 27].
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Id.
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Id.
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Whereas this seems to follow the idea that treaty law and customary international law follow
complimentary paths, Barker points out that there was a sense that the CPPC – DA “did little to
enhance the existing provisions of international law relating to the protection of diplomatic
personnel.”82 However, he points that while the ICJ in the Case Concerning the United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran83 was unwilling to examine the CPPC – DA Articles in
depth, the ICJ “clearly endorsed the position that even non-states parties to the [CPPC – DA]
remained bound by their obligation under the [VCDR and the VCCR] and under customary
international law to provide for the special protection of diplomatic personnel.”84 Thus, it does
not matter that Cambodia was not a Party to the CPPC – DA before 17 April 1975 because this
means that nothing changes with respect to Cambodia’s obligations under the VCDR either way.
In discussing the CPPC – DA, Barker pays special attention to the legal consequences of
the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya.85 The legal result of those terrorist
acts was United States v. Bin Laden.86 The court for the Southern District of New York found
four individuals guilty on all counts.87 While the results of this case seems to point in a positive
direction for successfully prosecuting individuals via criminal liability for violations of
diplomatic law, Barker points out that the original indictment in Bin Laden did not refer to the
81

Id. at 113.

82

Id. at 112.

83

Case concerning United States Diplomatic ad Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 ICJ 3 (May
24, 1980). [Reproduced in notebook 2 at Tab 33].

84

Barker, supra note 63, at 112.

85

Id. at 113 – 28.

86

United States v. Bin Laden, 93 F. Supp 2d 484 (2000). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 2 at
Tab 34] See also United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 189 (2000) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook 2 at Tab 36]; United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 600 (2000) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook 2 at Tab 35]; United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 225 (2000) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook 2 at Tab 37]. The court in United States v. Bin Laden, 93 F. Supp. 2d 484 (2000) noted that the
background facts were listed in these three cases.

87

Barker, supra note 63, at 128.
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CPPC – DA.88 Barker believes that this “indicates that United States prosecutors believed that
the provisions of the [CPPC – DA] were wholly inadequate as the basis for the prosecution of all
the consequences of the two attacks on United States Embassies.”89 While Barker welcomed the
successful prosecutions in the 1998 Embassy bombings case, he admits that “the current law
relating to the protection of diplomatic personnel played only a very small part in the
proceedings.”90 Barker concludes by stating that “[w]hile the [CPPC – DA] may well prove
useful in terms of attacks on individual diplomats, its relevance and effect in relation to major
attacks of this type seen in East Africa is, at best, peripheral.”91
The CPPC – DA presents two obstacles for determining whether or not VCDR violations
entail criminal responsibility prior to 1975. The first obstacle is the CPPC – DA appears to be a
natural progression of codified diplomatic law after the VCDR and the VCCR. The second
obstacle is that Cambodia did not become a Party to the CPPC – DA prior to 1975. These
obstacles are not as great as they seem. Even if the CPPC – DA is a natural progression of
codified diplomatic law, this does not undermine the fact that violations of the VCDR may have
incurred individual criminal responsibility. If this is the case, then it does not matter that
Cambodia was not a Party to the CPPC – DA. This will now be discussed in the analysis.
III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
Part A of this section will suggest that the Co-Prosecutor may indict an individual for

criminal liability for violations of the VCDR. This section will also present counterarguments to
such an approach. Part B of this section will develop elements of the crimes of violating the

88

Id. p. 114 – 115. “The indictment was later amended so as to include the murder and attempted murder
of internationally protected persons in Kenya and the attempted murder of internationally protected
persons in Tanzania.”

89

Id. p. 115.

90

Id. p. 128.

91

Id.
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VCDR, assuming arguendo, that such actions can incur individual criminal responsibility. Part
C will briefly discuss the potentials for alternative prosecution strategies.
A. Finding Individual Criminal Liability
i.

Treaty Law

The VCDR contains no penal provision. The VCCR contains no penal provision. The
CPPC – DA does contain a penal provision for attacks upon diplomats and mission premises.
However, Cambodia was not a signatory to the CPPC – DA in 1975 or at any point during the
DK government’s existence. Therefore, it is necessary to see if criminal liability for violations
of the VCDR existed in customary international law prior to 1975.
ii.

Customary International Law

Customary international law is the body of customs and practices of a state that develop
out of (1) diplomatic relations between states, (2) the practice of international organs, (3) the
laws, court decisions, military or administrative practices of States.92 In terms of the general
issue at hand, in order to prove that criminal liability for violations of the VCDR formed part of
customary international law, one must prove that there is evidence of such custom in one of the
three categories above.
The VCDR (1) is the codification of customary diplomatic law between States; (2) the
United Nations opened it for signature in 1961 and entered into force in 1964 and (3) more than
100 State were Parties to the VCDR before 17 April 1975.93 The following argument will point
out how VCDR violations incurred criminal liability in customary international law prior to
1975.
1. Argument that Customary International Law prohibited
VCDR violations prior to 1975
a. VCDR Preamble

92

Carter et al, supra note 53, at 121 – 22. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 29].

93

Denza, supra note 5, at 436 – 40 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 21].
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At first glance, it is clear: the second Optional Protocol to the VCDR, which concerns the
compulsory Settlement of Disputes for VCDR violations, provides only for State-Party liability.
There are no penal provisions. There is no mention of individual criminal liability regardless of
whether the violation against a diplomatic agent is during wartime or peacetime, or if during a
conflict, whether it is an international conflict or an internal one. On the other hand, the
Preamble of the VCDR includes the language, “Affirming that the rules of customary
international law should continue to govern questions not expressly regulated by the
provisions of the present Convention”94 which indicates that the second Optional Protocol to
the VCDR should not necessarily preclude any other finding of liability aside from State-Party
liability. Thus, customary international law can govern the question of criminal responsibility for
violations of the VCDR.
It is not clear why the VCDR and the VCCR have no provisions for international criminal
sanctions. Perhaps one reason is the nature of diplomacy whose birth was in Antiquity. The
VCDR today is a direct continuation of that tradition, with some developments, of course.95
Steven Ratner, a law professor at The University of Texas School of Law, has written that,
“Individuals were, at best, the third-party beneficiaries of the law of nations.” 96 When a person
suffered abuses, the laws prohibiting such abuses depended on whether the conduct took place
during wartime or peacetime. “Yet, [wartime and peacetime] fields of international law focused
almost exclusively on state responsibility, not individual accountability for violations”97 and
“abuses by one state of a foreign state’s citizens were clearly grounds for claims by the offended
state against the other.”98
94

VCDR, supra note 9, at Preamble (emphasis added). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab
1].

95

Denza, supra note 5, at 3 – 5. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 21].

96

Steven Ratner, The Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law, 33 Tex. Int’l L.J. 237, 241 (1998),
fn. d1. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 at Tab 57].

97

Id. at 241 – 42.
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The VCDR would not be the first treaty to see violations against its provisions transition
from entailing State-Party liability to individual liability.
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 are a codification of international humanitarian law
covering the treatment of soldiers and civilians during wartime. The development of
humanitarian law in the 20th century codified customary law in order to protect the sanctity of the
person and the right to exist and do so without being harmed. Both in the past and today,
soldiers engaged in conflict are treated as government agents carrying out that State’s policies.
Yet, the Geneva Conventions exist explicitly to protect the lives and wellbeing of such
individuals during conflict regardless of the circumstances surrounding the conflict. One of the
results of the Geneva Conventions is that actions against soldiers, which have violated the
Conventions, have incurred criminal liability. Diplomats, like soldiers, are government agents
carrying out their State’s policies in another nation but under different circumstances. In the
latter scenario, the receiving State has willingly accepted the diplomat whereas the soldier is
imposed upon the “receiving” territory in the former scenario. The question that should be asked
is when the inviolability of persons and property, which receive protection under the VCDR, is
breached, why are these violations not prosecuted unlike with soldiers who are protected under
the Geneva Conventions of 1949?
The Preamble of the VCDR allows for changes in implementation by “[a]ffirming that
the rules of customary international law should continue to govern questions not expressly
regulated by the provisions of the present Convention”. Professor Eileen Denza points out that at
the ILC Conference for the development of the draft VCDR Articles, Switzerland successfully
incorporated a statement similar to the language in the Preamble99 and that the majority of the
delegates found this acceptable.100 Therefore, the fact that the VCDR does not contain any penal
98

Id. at 242.

99

Eileen Denza, supra note 5, at 12 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 21].

100

Id. Denza notes that while several delegates did oppose this on the grounds of being a superfluous
addition, “the view of the majority was well expressed by a delegate of Israel: ‘Even though it might be
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provisions does not mean that prosecutors may not seek criminal liability against those who have
either personally violated a MSM’s person, the mission premises, or ordered such actions,
regardless of acting upon orders. Certainly, the VCDR would not be the first international treaty
to impose individual criminal liability for which no such liability was envisioned when it was
first adopted. Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 did not contain penal
provisions when it was adopted. However, that changed with the Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić trial
at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
It is the Tadić Trial that provides for an adequate analogy for how a treaty, which had no
penal provision, eventually entailed individual criminal responsibility for violations against it.
b. Common Article 3
No court has brought charges of criminal liability against any individuals for violations of
the VCDR. Therefore, it is necessary to draw analogies between similar situations in which
courts brought charges of criminal liability against individuals for violations that historically did
not incur such liability.
That Common Article 3 has incurred individual criminal liability without having a
provision for such101 is one of the strongest arguments for allowing violations of the VCDR to
carry individual criminal liability. Steven Ratner, a professor of law at The University of Texas
School of Law, has identified three “schisms” that have led to grave disparities in the
implementation of international criminal and humanitarian law in prosecuting human rights
abuses: “wartime atrocities v. peacetime atrocities,”102 “different criminality among wartime
atrocities: interstate v. civil conflicts,”103 and “different criminality among peacetime
self-evident that the rules of customary international law would continue to operate in the absence of
specific provisions on a particular point, that fact should be expressed in order to emphasize that there
was no intention to stifle the development of diplomatic law.’”
101

Ratner, The Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law, supra note 96 at 240. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook 4 at Tab 57]
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Id. at 239 – 240.
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Id. at 240.
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atrocities.”104 Ratner claims, at the core of these disparities is the distinction between state and
individual responsibility, wherein, historically, “the law of nations governed exclusively
relations between states (and between their sovereigns).”105 Ratner further explains that after
WWI and especially after WWII, change started to take place in the view of individual criminal
responsibility for some crimes, ultimately being brought to bear in the Nuremberg trials and
beyond;106 however, no real progress was made in closing any of the three “schisms.”107 Yet,
one of Nuremberg’s legacies was the laying of “groundwork for further development of
international law on criminal responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law and
human rights law.”108
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 provides for the protection of
victims of non-international conflicts.109 Common Article 3 is so called because it is common to
all four of the Geneva Conventions, the first dealing with wounded military personnel on the
battlefield, the second – wounded and shipwrecked military personnel on the seas, the third –
prisoners of war, and the fourth – civilians under enemy control. Until the Tadić Trial at the
ICTY, Common Article 3 did not entail individual criminal culpability. However, prior to this
trial judgment, scholars in the field, such as M. Cherif Bassiouni, noted that the absence of a
provision for individual criminal liability for Common Article 3 violations created a disparity in

104

Id. Ratner points out that while not necessarily ALL international atrocities are criminalized and
NONE of those that occur internally, “The corpus of peacetime atrocities regarded as incurring individual
criminal responsibility is haphazardly constructed…”

105

Id. at. 240.
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Id. at 242.
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Id. at 244.
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Id. at 244 – 45.
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Commentary on Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 6, art. 3. [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook 4 at Tab 77].
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justice for victims of the commission of crimes during conflicts.110 This is not the first instance
of a tribunal finding criminal liability for violations of conventions that did not provide for penal
stipulations.111 Theodor Meron, former President of and appeals judge for the ICTY, states:
The Fourth Hague Convention was silent on penal responsibility. The early
Geneva Conventions contain no penal provisions whatsoever; nor does the 1929
Prisoner of War Convention … which figured so prominently in the Nuremberg
trials as a basis for the prosecution and conviction of offenders. […] The
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals appear to have taken it for granted that
violations of the substantive provisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions
were criminal. These tribunals considered the provisions of the two treaties that
were declaratory of customary law as having created an adequate basis for
individual criminal responsibility. Thus, although neither the Geneva
Conventions that preceded those of 1949 nor the Fourth Hague Convention
contained explicit penal provisions, they were accepted as a basis for prosecutions
and convictions in the post—World War II tribunals.112
While it is apparent that the VCDR would not be the first treaty to entail individual
criminal liability for violations of its provisions, Common Article 3 itself was not the first to do
so. Furthermore, the quote above demonstrates that this analysis would hold for violations of
Common Article 3 and the incurrence of individual criminal liability in the Tadić Trial as
Common Article 3 was silent on any penal responsibility as was the Fourth Hague Convention.
i. Tadić Trial
The ICTY Prosecutor in his initial Indictment against Duško Tadić listed numerous
allegations including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Article 2 of the ICTY
Statute), violations of the laws or customs of war (Article 3 of the ICTY Statute), and crimes
against humanity (Article 5 of the ICTY Statute).113 During the trial, the Defense Counsel for
Tadić made an interlocutory appeal challenging the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICTY on
110

M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability, 59–
AUT Law & Contemp. Probs. 9, 13 – 15 (1996). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 at Tab 56].

111

Theodor Meron, Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 Am. J.
Int’l L. 551, 571 (2006). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 at Tab 58].
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Id. at 571 – 72.

113

Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, IT-94-1-I, Indictment (Feb. 13, 1995). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook 2 at Tab 38]. See also Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
art. 5. (Feb. 2006). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 at Tab 63].
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the basis that “the alleged crimes, even if proven, were committed in the context of an internal
armed conflict.”114 Tadić even challenged that there was any armed conflict in connection with
the allegations against him.115 The Appeals Chamber noted:
The emergence of international rules governing internal strife has occurred at two
different levels: at the level of customary law and at that of treaty law. Two
bodies of rules have thus crystallised, which are by no means conflicting or
inconsistent, but instead mutually support and supplement each other. Indeed, the
interplay between these two sets of rules is such that some treaty rules have
gradually become part of customary law. This holds true for common article 3 of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, as was authoritatively held by the International
Court of Justice (citation omitted), but also applies to […] the core of Additional
Protocol II of 1977.116 […] In an important subsequent development, States
specified certain minimum mandatory rules applicable to internal armed conflicts
in common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The International Court
of Justice has confirmed that these rules reflect “elementary considerations of
humanity” applicable under customary international law to any armed conflict,
whether it is of an internal or international character. (citation omitted).
Therefore, at least with respect to the minimum rules in common article 3, the
character of the conflict is irrelevant.117
The Appeals Chamber also went on to note that Common Article 3 contains a “procedural
mechanism inviting parties to internal conflict to agree to abide by the rest of the Geneva
Conventions.”118 It also pointed to several recent historical incidences wherein parties to a
conflict agreed to the “customary adherence to basic principles in internal conflicts.”119 The
Appeals Chamber found evidence of this customary adherence in the Congolese Civil War,120 in
the Operational Code of Conduct for Nigerian Armed Forces,121 and the 1988 stance of the rebels
114

Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 65 (Oct. 2, 1995). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 39].
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in El Salvador.122
The Appeals Chamber also stated that even though the European Union and the UN
Security Council in their resolutions in establishing the ICTY mentioned international
humanitarian law instead of specifically referring to common article 3, this “clearly articulat[ed]
the view that there exists a corpus of general principles and norms on internal armed conflict
embracing common Article 3 but having a much greater scope.”123
As to Tadić’s challenge to violations of common article 3 incurring criminal liability, the
Appeals Chamber noted that while there was no explicit reference to penal provisions, the
Nuremberg Tribunal “concluded that a finding of individual criminal responsibility is not barred
by the absence of treaty provisions on punishment of breaches.”124
The Nuremberg Tribunal considered a number of factors relevant to its conclusion
that the authors of particular prohibitions incur individual responsibility: the clear
and unequivocal recognition of the rules of warfare in international law and State
practice indicating an intention to criminalize the prohibition, including
statements by government officials and international organizations, as well as
punishment of violations by national courts and military tribunals (“citations
omitted”). Where these conditions are met, individuals must be held criminally
responsible,”125
Ultimately, the Appeals Chamber denied Tadić’s motion on the basis that it found that
the ICTY had jurisdiction over the acts in the Indictment under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute.126
On 14 December 1995, the Prosecutor issued a second amended indictment containing 34 counts
alleging violations of the ICTY Statute Articles 2, 3, and 5.127 In the Tadić Trial, The Trial
Chamber found that the requirements for the “application of the rules of customary international
122

Id. ¶ 107.
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Id. ¶ 116. (Emphasis in the original)
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Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, IT-94-1-I, Second Amended Indictment, (Dec. 14, 1995). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 41].
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humanitarian law contained in Common Article 3” were met.128 The Trial Chamber found Tadić
guilty on nine counts and on two additional counts, although only in part.129
ii. Consequence of the Tadić Trial
The ability to prosecute for individual criminal liability for Common Article 3 violations
did not end with the Tadić trial or with the ICTY. Numerous later ICTY cases have prosecuted
individuals accused of violating Common Article 3. The ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v.
Kvočka et al130 in its Decision on Preliminary Motions filed by Mlado Radić and Miroslav
Kvočka Challenging Jurisdiction, stated “[A]s pointed out by the jurisprudence of the
International Tribunal, the customary status of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,
which requires that parties abide by certain minimum fundamental humanitarian standards, has
been confirmed by the International Court of Justice.”131 The Fourth Amended Indictment
against Haradinaj on 16 October 2007132 is the most recent case to involve common article 3
violations. Beyond that, ICTR Statute, the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL),
and the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC) all give their respective
tribunals/courts jurisdiction over Common Article 3 violations.133 The ICTR’s first case indicted
an individual for violations of Common Article 3 in Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu.134
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Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 617, (May 7, 1997). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 42].
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Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., IT-98-30/1-I, Amended Indictment (Aug. 21, 2000). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook 3 at Tab 51].
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Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., IT-98-30/1, Decision on Preliminary Motions Filed by Mlado Radić and
Miroslav Kvočka Challenging Jurisdiction, ¶ 25 (April 1, 1999). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
3 at Tab 52].
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The Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al, IT-04-84-T, Fourth Amended Indictment (Oct. 16 2007).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 43].
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See Statute for the International Tribunal for Rwanda art 4, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter
ICTR Statute]. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 at Tab 64]. Special Statue for the Special Court
for Sierra Leone, art. 3, [hereinafter SCSL Statute]. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 at Tab 65].
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Some may argue that criminally prosecuting an individual for violations of Common
Article 3,135 did not enter into customary international law in 1995 when the ICTY Appeal
Chamber dismissed the Tadić Defence Motion on Jurisdiction. However, evidence points to the
fact that it had been a part of customary international law before 1986, when, in the Nicaragua v.
United States case before the ICJ, the Court stated that Common Article 3 rules: “merely
demands respect for certain rules, which were already recognized as essential in all civilised
countries, and embodied in the municipal law of the states in question long before the
Convention was signed…”136 This demonstrates that criminal culpability of violations of
Common Article 3 as being part of the customary international law before 1949. The Trial
Chamber went on stating that violations of Common Article 3 are similar in content to the grave
breaches provisions and that since grave breaches entail criminal liability, so do violations of
Common Article 3.137 The Trial Chamber also pointed out that national courts had tried
individuals for criminal liability for violations of Common Article 3.138
The Trial Chamber also found that prosecuting Tadić for Common Article 3 violations
did not breach the principle of nullum crimen sine lege as Common Article 3 is part of customary
international law.139 The ICTY Trial Chamber, in the Tadić Trial Decision on the Defence
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(e)(vi), July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999
[hereinafter ICC Statute]. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 at Tab 66].
134

Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-I, Indictment (no date given). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook 4 at Tab 53].
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Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 614 (Sept. 2, 1998).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 at Tab 54].
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Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 4 (Merits Judgement of 27 June 1986), [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 44]. Cited in Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 67, (Aug. 10, 1995). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 39].
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Motion on Jurisdiction, also claimed that “no nexus is required in customary international law
between crimes against humanity and crimes against peace or war crimes is strongly evidenced
by subsequent case law [following the Einsatzgruppen case].”140 The latter finding allows for a
wider application of Common Article 3 prosecutions.
iii. How the Tadić Trial Helps Prove that violations
of the VCDR entail criminal responsibility
The Decision on the Defence Motion for Jurisdiction in Tadić demonstrates that it is
possible for violations of an international instrument to incur individual criminal liability when
there is no penal provision contained within it. Not only did the Trial Chamber convict Tadić on
numerous counts of Common Article 3 violations,141 the ICTY Trial and Appeal Chambers have
also indicted several subsequent persons of such violations. As explained above, this legal
phenomenon has not stopped at the doors of the ICTY but has become custom for the ICTR and
the ICC. The ICTR has indicted several persons for violations of Common Article 3 and the ICC
Statute gives the ICC jurisdiction over Common Article 3 violations.142
In addition, the holding in the Tadić Decision on the Defence Motion for Jurisdiction also
demonstrated that criminal sanctions for violations of Common Article 3 were customary before
1995.143 In that statement, the Trial Chamber referenced Jordan Paust and Albert Blaustein’s
article, War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due Process: The Bangladesh Experience.144 While the
section the Tadić Trial Chamber relies on is the authors’ focus on the customary law of war, it is

140

Id. ¶ 79.
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Prosecutor v. Tadić, Opinion and Judgement, supra note 128. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
2 at Tab 42].
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Id.
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Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, supra note 137, at ¶ 68.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 39].
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Jordan Paust & Albert Blaustein, War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due Process: The Bangladesh
Experience, 11 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1, 25 (1978). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook 4 at Tab 59].
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instructive in demonstrating how the customary law of diplomacy, too, may allow for criminal
liability before 1975.
“In fact, there were very few trials of a multinational nature prior to Nuremberg.
The lack of trials, however, is not a community denial of law or of individual
responsibility for a violation of that law. One has stated that there were few trials
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries not because of any theory of individual
immunity from law or sole responsibility resting with the state (the old
object/subject confusion), but because nations generally included an amnesty
clause in peace treaties or formal declarations. Individual responsibility was
recognized, but amnesty often specifically granted, until after World War I when
nations began to demand enforcement against individuals by other states as
well.”145
This illustrates that violations of Common Article 3 did not pass into customary international law
with the Tadić Trial but had been present in customary international law since long before World
War II. Paust and Blaustein also state that there were several trials in the United States for
violations of laws of war prior to the 1870s. Following that period there were only very few,146
though this observation does not mean that criminalizing violations of the laws of war had fallen
out of favor in the realm of customary international law. In fact, the trials at Nuremberg and
Tokyo as well as the creation of several ad hoc tribunals illustrates that the trend has been to
broaden criminalization of violations of the rules of war.
It is easy to draw a parallel between violations of the VCDR and Common Article 3
violations based on what the Tadić Trial Chamber stated in its Decision on the Defence Motion
on Jurisdiction. The Trial Chamber stated that Common Article 3 violations are criminal in
nature, they are similar in substance to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and
national courts have tried individuals charged with violations similar to Common Article 3.147
First, VCDR violations are criminal in nature. Second, such violations are similar in substance
to both crimes against humanity (when there is a violation of the inviolability of the diplomatic
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MSM) and grave breaches of the Geneva Convention of 1949 (when there is a violation of the
mission premises and related property). Lastly, national courts have been trying individuals for
crimes such as kidnapping, murder, and illegal detention. These acts are criminal. The only
difference is whether a person directs them against a person protected under the VCDR or not.
2. Arguments against
The arguments above support the notion that individual criminal responsibility has
always been a part of the VCDR but not yet part of international criminal precedent. The
Defense for a Suspect may argue that this is fallacious. Barker’s analysis of the CPPC – DA
suggests that the VCDR and the VCCR do not have penal provisions because States were
apprehensive about being obligated to enter into their laws the duty to prosecute or extradite
VCDR violators.148 If States were apprehensive about the CPPC – DA obligating them to
change their internal laws in 1973, it is likely that States were at least as apprehensive about the
VCDR obligating them to change their internal laws in order to criminalize violations of the
VCDR. It is likely the omission of a penal provision from the VCDR was deliberate.
Barker also writes that in the Middle Ages the envoy was imbued with inviolability
because “anyone who injured or molested or impeded an envoy or one of his party then damaged
the honour of the king and committed treason, just as did anyone who killed an ambassador.”149
Any abuse against the diplomatic agent or mission premises was seen as an attack upon the King.
Translated to today’s standards, such abuses are still seen as being committed not by individuals
but by the receiving State, which is charged with protecting the inviolability of diplomatic agents
and mission premises. The taking hostage of diplomats at the US Embassy in Tehran could
easily be seen as an attack not on diplomats but on the United States.
a. VCDR Preamble inclusion of customary international
law irrelevant
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The Defense for a Suspect may note that while it is true that the VCDR Preamble stated
that customary international law should continue to govern issues not directly addressed in the
body of the VCDR, this does not change the fact that violations of the VCDR do not incur
individual criminal liability. This is because individual criminal liability for VCDR violations
has become part of international law.
The weakest aspect of the argument supporting criminal liability for VCDR violations is
the long list of incidents involving clear violations of the inviolability of both the mission
premises and the person of the MSM with as yet no attempts at criminal prosecution. The
storming of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979 and the subsequent holding hostage of most of its
staff occurred after the temporal jurisdiction of the ECCC. If violations of the VCDR entailing
criminal liability for individuals who committed such acts had been part of customary
international law by 1975, then why didn’t such a case entail such liability? There have been
more than 200 cases of attacks upon US missions abroad and upon US diplomatic agents in at
least one decade150 succeeding the ECCC temporal jurisdiction. If holding individuals
criminally liable for violations of the VCDR has been a possible approach, why hasn’t there been
at least one attempt at criminal prosecution against any one person suspected of responsibility?
The absence of any such prosecution, to say the least, attempt at criminal prosecution, must mean
that the holding of a person individually criminally responsible for violations of the VCDR has
yet to reach the level of international customary law. Although there were convictions for the
1998 bombing of the US Embassies in the Tanzania and Kenya in 2001,151 the basis for the
prosecution’s case was not found in the CPPC – DA,152 to which Cambodia had not yet acceded
in 1975. In short, there have never been any criminal prosecutions, which have cited violations
of the inviolability of diplomatic agents and/or foreign missions premises as violations of the
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VCDR.
One of the reasons there has never been any individual criminal liability is that
diplomacy, which had developed within the ancient Greek city-states and diplomatic missions,
developed into a more permanent form under the royal courts of Europe following the Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648. Perhaps, because of the political environment out of which diplomacy
evolved, diplomatic law never had considered that attacks or other abuses upon diplomatic
agents or mission premises as incurring individual criminal liability. This is not to say that
individual criminal liability will never be a potential avenue of prosecution in the future for
violations of the VCDR, it just means that it was not in 1975.
b. Common Article 3 analogy is irrelevant
The Defense for a Suspect may argue that the analogy between violations of Common
Article 3 incurring individual criminal liability and the potential for violations of the VCDR
doing likewise is irrelevant. The basis for this counterargument is, first, the substance and
history of Common Article 3. The second half of the counterargument is that there is a clear
divergence between the paths of Common Article 3 and the VCDR given the history of their
respective violations.
First, the substance of Common Article 3 encapsulates the rest of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.153 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) set out to create
protocols, which would protect soldiers and other protected classes of people under the rest of
the Geneva Convention of 1949 in international conflicts. The ICRC also set out to create the
same protections for the same classes of people but within internal conflicts and Common Article
3 enshrines this. However, States often felt that the ICRC interfered with their internal affairs
when it attempted to assist in aiding victims of internal conflicts.154 Thus, States treated such
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actions as “unfriendly attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the country concerned.”155 In
time, the aims of the ICRC gained some measured acceptance amongst various governments.156
After several disagreements between States, a proposal won the support of a majority of States
Parties and the ICRC adopted this version and it appeared as it does now.157
The VCDR is like Common Article 3 in that it provides protections for a certain class of
people. However, the VCDR is different from Common Article 3 in that it specifically protects a
narrower class of people during a broader set of circumstances. The latter gives provisions for
soldiers and civilians, which may include diplomatic personnel but not exclusively so, during
conflicts of an internal character. The VCDR exclusively provides for privileges and immunities
for MSMs and, in some circumstances, private servants to MSMs and the mission. Common
Article 3 is much more narrow in application as it deals with internal conflicts while the VCDR’s
privileges and immunities apply both in peacetime and wartime and only begin and terminate
with the MSM’s departure and return to the sending State.
The Defense may also argue that while violations of Common Article 3 did eventually
entail individual criminal responsibility does not mean that any treaty, which does not possess a
penal provision should necessarily entail such responsibility when someone violates it. The
reason international tribunals now hold violators of Common Article 3 criminally liable is that
such violations at the international level (i.e. during an armed conflict of an international
character) automatically carry such liability. This is not the case with violations of the VCDR.
VCDR violations are always at the international level since such violations naturally involve at
least the sending and receiving States. Yet, there is no penal provision for such violations as
with the Geneva Conventions of 1949. This is because States still have a proper, working
avenue for settling disputes with States, whose citizens violate the inviolability of the MSM or
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the mission. There has been no cessation of affected States Parties to the VCDR bringing cases
before the ICJ or other courts or tribunals in order to settle disputes with the offending State.158
In addition, when someone commits violations of the VCDR that can be classified as criminal
actions in the receiving State, the receiving State likely has penal provisions that entail individual
criminal responsibility. Thus, an arbitral tribunal or the ICJ may vindicate the offended sending
State via reparations while the receiving State is able to punish, if necessary, the individual
violator. The ECCC can invoke the Cambodia 1956 Penal Code for the crimes of homicide,
torture, and religious persecution. The ECCC can punish for crimes against humanity and grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The actions, which Articles 3, 5, and 6 of the
ECCC Statute enumerate, are sufficient to cover any violations of the VCDR. For instance, the
detention of MSMs is a violation of VCDR Article 22 but is also a crime against humanity –
imprisonment – under Article 5 of the ECCC Statute.159
Another rift in the analogy between Common Article 3 and the VCDR incurring criminal
liability is the number of actual violations and number of indictments seeking criminal
responsibility for such violations. The drafters of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 brought
Common Article 3 into existence in 1949. In 1997, the ICTY handed down the first conviction,
against Tadić, for Common Article 3 violations. Since that first conviction, there have been
several indictment for the criminal responsibility of Common Article 3 violations, including the
latest ICTY indictment.160 The problem with the Common Article 3 analogy is that while there
have been numerous violations of the VCDR since its entering into force in 1964, there have
been no indictments by any international body for violations of it.
3. Rebuttals to Counterarguments
158

See Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda)
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The following are specific rebuttals the Co-Prosecutor can utilize against the specific
counterarguments above.
a. VCDR Preamble inclusion of customary international
law relevant
The ICJ, in the Case concerning US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, stated that
non-state parties such as Cambodia must still abide by the VCDR and VCCR and customary
international law to protect diplomats.161 The VCDR obligated States Parties to it to abide by its
provisions and the Preamble of the VCDR provides for the inclusion of international customary
law where the VCDR does not expressly address an issue, including a penal provision.
Ratner wrote that “individuals were, at best, the third-party beneficiaries of the law of
nations.”162 While the earlier models of the inviolability of the diplomatic agent may have been
based on the extension of the monarch, this had changed long before 1975 as Denza notes that
what the VCDR codified was largely in place by 1758.163 That there have been no cases
involving criminal prosecution for violations of the VCDR even though there have been cases
before the ICJ since 1975 does not indicate that such prosecution did not form part of
international customary law in 1975 or even earlier. In the Case concerning US Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran, it was clear that the newly formed Islamic Republic of Iran had no
intention of participating in the proceedings before the ICJ once the US had filed a case against
Iran.164 Because the ICJ did not have the ability to enforce its judgments, all that was left to the
US was to resort to the Security Council.165 Furthermore, Iran also refused to comply with the
ICJ’s order in the Anglo – Iranian Oil Co. Case.166 When considering the Case concerning US
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Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, one must realize that Iran was unwilling to cooperate
with the United States and the United Nations in resolving this issue. There were no more
diplomatic ties between the United States and Iran. The probability of resolving the matter
through criminal prosecution of those most responsible for the seizure of the US Embassy and
taking hostage of its staff was as unlikely as Iran extraditing those who were most responsible to
the United States to stand trial for violations of the VCDR or of any other international
instrument. Ultimately, the US – Iran Claims Tribunal oversaw numerous civil cases, some of
which are still ongoing today.167
b. Common Article 3 analogy is not irrelevant.
The Common Article 3 analogous argument is not irrelevant because it is not solely based
on the substance of what constitutes such violations vis-à-vis the remaining Articles of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949. After all, Common Article 3 is the “common principle which
governs [the Geneva Conventions of 1949].”168 The analogy is based more upon the idea that a
treaty that does not possess a penal provision does not preclude individual criminal liability for
violations of it. Furthermore, the Defense may make the argument that simply because
violations of Common Article 3 crossed the threshold from not entailing criminal liability to so
doing does not necessarily mean that the VCDR, which also has no penal provisions, should do
so. In response, it is necessary to reiterate that the Trial Chamber in Tadić held three criteria
allowed violations of Common Article 3 to incur criminal liability: 1) such violations are
criminal in nature, 2) they are similar in substance to both crimes against humanity and grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and 3) national courts have tried individuals for
crimes similar to violations of Common Article 3.169 To reiterate, it is clear that violations of the
166
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VCDR fulfill all three.
The potential counterargument does raise one important point: while the lack of a penal
provision in the VCDR does not preclude the possibility of prosecution for individual criminal
liability for violations of its privileges and immunities of both MSMs, their family members,
property, and the mission, its premises and property, there has been no attempt at any such
prosecution at the international level. One argument is that violations of the Common Article 3
did not entail criminal liability at the international level between 1949 and 1995 because no
international criminal tribunals existed, which could prosecute for such crimes. This certainly
does not imply that violations of Common Article 3 entered into customary international law
until 1995. In fact, the Appeals Chamber, in its Judgment in the Ćelebići Trial, held that:
“In relation to the ICTR Statute and the Secretary-General’s statement in his
ICTR report that common Article 3 was criminalised for the first time, the Trial
Chamber held: “the United Nations cannot ‘criminalise’ any of the provisions
of international humanitarian law by the simple act of granting subjectmatter jurisdiction to an international tribunal. The International Tribunal
merely identifies and applies existing customary international law and, as
stated above, this is not dependent upon an express recognition in the Statute
of the content of that custom, although express reference may be made, as in
the Statute of the ICTR” This statement is fully consistent with the Appeals
Chamber’s finding that the lack of explicit reference to common Article 3 in the
Tribunal’s Statute does not warrant a conclusion that violations of common
Article 3 may not attract individual criminal responsibility.”170
Customary international law determines whether an action is criminal. As regards violations of
Common Article 3, Paust and Blaustein found that individual criminal responsibility did exist
even prior to 1949 but subsequent amnesty clauses for such actions cloaked this reality.171
B. Establishing a conflict nexus
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As stated earlier in the memorandum, there is no requirement for an armed conflict
nexus, whether internal or international, in order to prosecute for individual criminal liability for
violations of the VCDR. The VCDR contains no provision that is related to an armed conflict
nexus. Therefore, if the VCDR does entail individual criminal liability for a violation that would
normally require an armed conflict nexus, whether international or internal, this nexus
requirement will not transfer over to VCDR. For example, the taking of hostages is a crime
which rises to the level of a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 but is also a
violation of VCDR Article 29. If the Co-Prosecutor indicts the Suspect of such a crime as
committing a grave breach, then there is an armed conflict nexus requirement.172 If the CoProsecutor seeks an indictment for the commission of the same crime as a violation of the
VCDR, there is no such requirement, whether the conflict was internal, international, or
nonexistent.
C. Other Consideration
This year, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) rendered a judgment finding Alex
Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, and Santigie Borbour Kanu guilty on several counts, which
included “conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or
groups, or using them to participate actively in hostilities.”173 This judgment is the “first time
that an international tribunal has ruled on the charge of recruitment of child soldiers into an
armed force…”174
The Prosecutor for the SCSL indicted Sam Hinga Norman for using child soldiers.175
The Special Court’s Appeals Chamber “issued a significant ruling in 2004 that the prohibition on
the recruitment or use of children under the age of 15 had crystallized as customary international
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law prior to 1996, and that individuals bore criminal responsibility for such acts.”176 Because
this is only the first trial to hold someone liable for enlisting and utilizing child soldiers, it
remains to be seen whether this particular sort of conviction is upheld on appeal. Therefore, the
Co-Prosecutor should pay special attention to those particular cases involving the use of child
soldiers at the SCSL to see how the Trial and Appeal Chambers further develop their findings on
this particular crime and whether it continues to entail individual criminal responsibility.
D. ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF VIOLATING THE VCDR177
Assuming, arguendo, that the VCDR can entail individual criminal liability, this section
will consider the elements of such liability. Because there is no precedent wherein a court or
tribunal has held any person individually criminally culpable for violations of the VCDR, no
elements that constitute this type of crime have been established. All judicial decisions
concerning violations of the VCDR have been in cases between States. Thus, they have only
dealt with actus reus which invokes strict liability upon the State.178
Although violations of the VCDR have in past cases incurred State party liability,
violations of the VCDR may involve activity which the Cambodian 1956 Penal Code
criminalized.179 The elements set out by the ICC Statute for specific crimes can be instructive as
they relate to the ECCC Statute. 1) Article 3 of the ECCC Statute provides for the crimes of
homicide, torture, and religious persecution; ECCC Article 5 covers crimes against humanity;
and 3) ECCC Statute Article 6 covers grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
(specific crimes such as persecution,180 unlawful confinement of a civilian).181
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Before the Co-Prosecutor can determine whether an action is prosecutable as a violation
of the VCDR or a different treaty and/or law, he must first determine whether the general
elements of a crime against a person and/or property protected by the VCDR has been fulfilled.
This is similar to the ICC Statute’s Elements of Crimes. Looking to the elements, the ICC
Statute can demonstrate the difference between general and specific elements.
Article 8(2)(a)(i) lists the elements of the war crime of willful killing:182
1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that
protected status.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an
international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the
existence of an armed conflict.183
The elements of this particular crime are most illuminating in creating a set of elements. The
war crime of willful killing entails criminal liability for violations of the laws of war as it sets out
elements for a protected group and the mens rea for violation of the provisions of the treaty that
protect a specific class of people. This is similar to what should constitute the elements of a
criminal violation of the VCDR, 1) the victim is of a protected class and 2) the perpetrator knew
that. The first two elements are specific to the crime while the last three are more general and
based on the broader circumstances linked to the crime.
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The war crime of willful killing is useful in drawing parallels between its elements and
the elements of what constitute a criminal violation of the VCDR and this section will rely on
that specific war crime as an example. In order for the crime of willful killing, or any other
crime under Article 8 of the ICC Statute of the Elements of Crimes, to rise to the level of a war
crime, then the perpetrator must fulfill the requirements in elements 2 – 5. If these elements are
not met, then the crime of willful killing cannot be considered a war crime. It will simply be a
crime of willful killing. If that is the case, a prosecutor may seek to indict for such a crime under
one of the homicide statutes of the jurisdiction in which the perpetrator committed the crime.
Also, there is the need for a conflict nexus in order for a crime to rise to the level of a war crime,
which elements 4 and 5 cover.184 However, since the VCDR makes no mention of the necessity
of such a nexus, then there is no conflict nexus required in order for a violation of the VCDR to
incur individual criminal responsibility. Under Article 8(2)(a)(i), which sets out the elements of
willful killing as a war crime, the first element is: “The perpetrator killed one or more
persons.”185 This first element is identical to the first element in the crime against humanity of
murder.186 Thus, the actus reus for willful killing, as a violation of the VCDR, is established.
In order to establish a willful killing or murder as a violation of the VCDR, whether it can
be classified as a war crime, grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, or a crime against
humanity, then the elements of such a crime should read:
(1) The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct.
(2) The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
(3) Such a person or persons were protected under the VCDR.
(4) The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that
protected status.
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The first element sets out the required status of the perpetrator. The second element establishes
the specific actus reus. The third element establishes that the victim must be a person protected
by the VCDR. The fourth element is the mens rea that establishes the requisite intent. The
following sub-sections will break down each of these steps and analyze them.
i.

Status of perpetrator

In order for the perpetrator’s crime to incur individual criminal liability under the VCDR,
he needs to be a State actor. If the perpetrator is not a state actor, then any violation of the
VCDR cannot incur criminal liability as a violation of the Convention because individuals are
not parties to it. For example, if someone, who is not a State actor, murders a diplomatic agent,
then that person can be prosecuted for homicide under the Cambodian Penal Code of 1956. The
Co-Prosecutor cannot move to hold the murderer responsible for a criminal violation of the
VCDR, in this case, for breach of Article 29. However, if the perpetrator was a State actor at the
time of the commission of the crime, then the Co-Prosecutor can indict this person for individual
criminal responsibility for such action. Once he has established this element, then the CoProsecutor must determine under which mode of individual criminal liability he must indict the
perpetrator.
A dilemma may arise when the perpetrator of a crime that violates the VCDR is not a de
jure actor but whose status may make him a de facto state actor. Although this factor is beyond
the scope of this memorandum, it would be worthwhile for the Office of the Co-Prosecutor to
further investigate these differences further. Cases at the ICTY have dealt with determining a
Suspect’s status as either de jure or de facto. One such case is Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, in
which the Prosecutor indicted Aleksovski, a Bosnian Serb, with crimes against humanity during
his tenure as prison warden in the Laška Valley area of Bosnia.187
ii.

Actus Reus
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First, the Co-Prosecutor must establish that someone or some people committed the act or
that the act was a result of the Suspect’s omission. The latter part is necessary because there
have been cases before the ICJ, which has found for State-party liability because the State failed
to protect foreign MSMs from acts constituting violations of the VCDR.188 Where a State actor
is charged with protecting foreign MSMs from violations against their person and/or property
and this occurs, the omission may carry criminal liability. The Case concerning US Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran illustrates this difference. The storming of the Embassy and the
taking of hostages of American MSMs involved both active perpetrators of those crimes and the
omission of State actors.189 On 4 November 1979, a group of armed individuals, who were selfdescribed as “Muslim Student Followers of the Imam’s Policy,” stormed the US Embassy and
took numerous MSMs hostage.190 While direct appeals were made to the Iranian government, it
made no effort to resolve the situation.191 The ICJ noted that “the Iranian security personnel are
reported to have simply disappeared from the scene; at all events it is established that they made
no apparent effort to deter or prevent the demonstrators from seizing the Embassy’s premises.”192
In the situation above, it is clear that State actors, by omission, allowed violations of the
VCDR. Under the elements of criminal violations of the VCDR, those who did not fulfill their
duty to protect the US Embassy may be held individually criminally liable for such omissions.
Translated to the sort of charges the ECCC Co-Prosecutor is seeking, those most responsible for
188
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violations of the VCDR, whether by deliberate action or omission, may be held responsible for
violations of the VCDR. Another example helps to illustrate the culpability of omissions. The
Khmer Rouge removed Cambodian husbands to foreign MSMs from the French Embassy and
murdered them.193 While the murdering of the Cambodian husbands is not in violation of the
VCDR, the Khmer Rouge’s entry into the Embassy to remove the Cambodian husbands was.
Unless the head of mission gave permission for the Khmer Rouge to do so, this is in direct
violation of Article 22 of the VCDR. Those most responsible for the illegal entry of the Khmer
Rouge into the French Embassy were not just the soldiers and other cadre who entered the
embassy but those who were most responsible for insuring that no Khmer Rouge cadre was to act
in contravention of the VCDR.
The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals established the four modes of liability that have
been further developed in the statutes and case law of the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals of the
present day. There are several modes of liability for individual criminal liability: personal,
command responsibility, joint criminal enterprise, and aiding and abetting. A more in-depth
discussion and analysis of the possible modes of individual criminal liability is beyond the scope
of this memorandum.
iii.

In Contravention of VCDR

The Co-Prosecutor must establish the actus reus and that it was in contravention of the
VCDR. The government of DK remained bound to the VCDR even though a previous
Cambodian government had acceded to the VCDR.194 If the actus reus was not in contravention
of the VCDR, then the crime cannot be classified as such. Clearly, when a State actor detains a
foreign MSM, this is a violation of Article 29. However, if a State actor detained a recalled
diplomat, then this is not a violation of the VCDR as that treaty did not provide that as one of the
responsibilities of the sending State to its own MSMs.
193

Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to General Assembly resolution
52/135 (18 February 1999) ¶ 79. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 19].

194

Moore, supra note 56, at 249.
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iv.

Mens Rea

The last element the Co-Prosecutor must establish is the requisite mens rea in addition to
any elements involved in the above modes of individual criminal liability. The element that the
Co-Prosecutor must establish is that the perpetrator committed the act with the willful disregard
of the privileges and immunities that the VCDR affords the class of people it protects. Under the
corresponding ICC Statute Element of the Crime, the mens rea element for the war crime of
willful killing under Article 8(2)(a)(i) “recognizes the interplay between articles 30 and 32.”195
Article 30 reads:
(1) Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable
for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the
material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.
(2) For purposes of this article, a person has intent where:
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence
or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.
(3) For the purposes of this article, “knowledge” means awareness that a
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of
events. “Know” and “knowingly” shall be construed accordingly.196
Article 32 covers mistake of fact or mistake of law, and reads:
(1) A mistake of fact shall be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility only
if it negates the mental element by the crime.
(2) A mistake of law as to whether a particular type of conduct is a crime within
the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be a ground for excluding criminal
responsibility. A mistake of law may, however, be a ground for excluding
criminal responsibility if it negates the mental element required by such a
crime, or as provided for in article 33.197
In the case of the hypothetical wherein a perpetrator deprives a foreign MSM of physical liberty,
such as detaining him, this meets the elements of the crimes if only the perpetrator (1) committed
the violation of the VCDR with the intent of detaining the foreign MSM and (2) knew that this
action was in violation of the VCDR. The perpetrator fulfills the intent requirement if he (1)
195

ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 182, at fn. 31. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 at Tab
67].
196

ICC Statute, supra note 133, art. 30. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 at Tab 62].

197

Id. art. 32, art. 33. Article 33 stipulates when acting upon superior orders and prescription of law is and
is not a defense.
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meant to engage in detaining the foreign MSM and (2) meant to cause the consequence of the
foreign MSM’s deprivation of physical liberty. The perpetrator fulfills the knowledge
requirement if he was aware that the MSM was protected by the VCDR, which forbids detention
under Article 29. The perpetrator may seek defense against these elements based on mistake of
fact or law.
v.

Specific Elements to be determined by the ICC Statute

The ICC Statute developed a list of the elements of the crimes defined as genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The ECCC should use the ICC Statute elements as the
ad hoc tribunals of the ICTY, the ICTR, and the SCSL have deferred to this particular statute of
guidance.198 This section will survey the ICC Statute Elements of the Crime specific to the four
questions that the Co-Prosecutor posed, which are listed in Section I(b)(v) of this memorandum.
It is necessary to note, however, that the author of this memorandum did not have access to the
investigative reports or sealed indictments. Therefore, the subsequent choice of elements and the
analysis of them is not exhaustive.199
E. CONCLUSION
Prosecuting individuals for criminal responsibility for violating the VCDR is a legal
novelty. However, there is ample evidence, which demonstrates that the possibility of VCDR
violations entailing criminal liability has existed in customary international law prior to 1975.
While there have been no prosecutions for such liability for VCDR violations, proving that
criminal liability is a possibility is easily reached by analogy. Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions does not have a penal provision. Its drafters did not envision it as incurring
criminal liability when a person committed acts contrary to its stipulations. However, in 1997,
the ICTY convicted Duško Tadić on several criminal counts of Article 3 violations in Prosecutor

198

William Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and
Sierra Leone 291 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006).
199

Part II of the finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes is a comprehensive list of elements of the
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
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v. Tadić. In light of this, there are still strong counterarguments to the proposition that the VCDR
violations may entail liability. The best rebuttal is found in the ICTY Trial Chamber’s reasoning
as to why it held that Common Article 3 violations incurred criminal liability in customary
international law long before the events that formed the basis of the indictment against Tadić.
The Trial Chamber held that violations of Common Article 3 are 1) criminal in nature, 2) they
are similar in substance to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and 3) national
courts have tried individuals charged with violations similar to Common Article 3.200 Violations
of the VCDR fulfill all three criteria. The substance of these criteria is not recent but has been in
existence since at least 1961. Thus, the possibility of VCDR violations incurring criminal
liability has been present in customary international law since at least 1961.
IV.

ALTERNATIVES TO PROSECUTION FOR CRIMES AS VIOLATIONS OF
THE VCDR
This section does not consider whether it is possible that a person may be prosecuted for

criminal liability for violations of the VCDR. However, this section provides the Co-Prosecutor
with alternative avenues for prosecution of actions, which contravened the VCDR without
prosecuting them as violations of the VCDR. For instance, if the Co-Prosecutor indicts a
Suspect on a charge of torture of a person protected under the VCDR Articles, he may also
prosecute the charge as a violation of the 1956 Penal Code (Article 3 of the ECCC Statute) or as
a crime against humanity (Article 5 of the ECCC Statute) as defined in the ICC Statute.
A. 1956 Penal Code (ECCC Statute Article 3)
Article 3 of the ECCC Statute grants authority to the Extraordinary Chambers to
prosecute for violations of 1956 Penal Code of Cambodia committed during ECCC’s temporal
jurisdiction. These crimes include only homicide, torture, and religious persecution. If
prosecution of one of these acts is not possible as a criminal prosecution of a VCDR violation,
then seeking prosecution under the 1956 Penal Code may suffice. For example, DK recalled
200

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, supra note 137, at ¶ 68.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 39].
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Chheuk Moeung Mao, who was Ambassador to Switzerland. The authorities detained Mao at S21 in 1976 and Mao was killed the following year.201 Historical records demonstrate that the
Khmer Rouge tortured the detainees at S-21.202
B. Crimes Against Humanity (ECCC Statute Article 5)
Article 7 of the Elements of Crimes lists eleven specific crimes against humanity. One of
the crimes against humanity concerns crimes of a sexual nature and lists six crimes specific to
this category.203 The other crimes are murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or
forcible transfer of population, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty,
torture, persecution, enforced disappearance of persons, apartheid, and other inhumane acts.204
The most positive aspect of this alternative prosecution strategy is that it allows the CoProsecutor the chance to successfully prosecute those persons most responsible for committing
crimes contrary to the inviolability of the MSM. Where there is no clear indication the Khmer
Rouge killed foreign MSMs, there is clear evidence that recalled Cambodian MSMs did not
escape the clutches of the Khmer Rouge and were oftentimes executed.205 Sean An was a DK
201

Email from Craig Etcheson, Investigator, Office of the Co-Prosecutors, Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia. (Oct 24, 2007, 09:47:35 EST) (on file with author). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook 4 at Tab 70].

202

Id.

203

ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 182, at 2. The six crimes are rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and sexual violence. [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook 4 at Tab 67].
204
Id.
205

Email from Craig Etcheson, supra note, 201.

“First, we need to distinguish among three categories of Cambodian diplomats: (1) diplomatic
representatives of Lon Nol's Khmer Republic government, mostly accredited to Western countries as of
April 1975; (2) diplomatic representatives of the Sihanouk/Khmer Rouge GRUNK exile government,
mostly accredited to communist bloc countries as of April 1975; and (3) diplomatic representatives of the
Democratic Kampuchea government between 1975 and 1978, again mostly accredited to communist bloc
countries.
All of categories 1 and 2 were recalled at the beginning of the DK regime. Some (perhaps very few) of
category 1 returned, and most likely all would have been killed fairly quickly; one possible example here
is Chheuk Moeung Mao, Ambassador to Switzerland, who ended up at S-21 in 1976 and was killed early
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ambassador to Vietnam. The DK government recalled him and he was executed in 1978.206
Because the VCDR does not provide for the responsibilities of the sending State to its MSMs,
the Co-Prosecutor may not seek individual criminal responsibility for this action as it does not
violate the VCDR. Another positive aspect about this strategy is that there is no requirement for
an armed conflict nexus.
C. Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (ECCC Statute Article 6)
The Co-Prosecutor may seek to indict crimes against the property of the foreign missions
and foreign MSMs under Article 6 of the ECCC Statute. One of the grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 is “the destruction and serious damage to property, not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.” The downside to this approach is
that it requires an international armed conflict nexus. This means that when foreign mission
property was damaged, looted, and/or destroyed, in order to prosecute for such wanton
destruction, the Co-Prosecutor must show that the actions occurred as a consequence of an
international armed conflict. If such attacks upon foreign mission property did not occur within

in 1977 (TSA C199). It is possible that Mao was a GRUNK ambassador, but I think he was Khmer
Republic, would have to check his confession or talk to some KR guys who would know. Most (perhaps
nearly all) of category 2 returned, and many were killed; an example of this is Huot Sambath, the
GRUNK Ambassador to Yugoslavia, who was killed at S-21 in 1976 (TSA H89).
During the DK regime, Phnom Penh frequently recalled its own ambassadors for consultations, and often
those consultations were concluded at S-21. Examples of this include Sean An, DK Ambassador to
Hanoi (TSA S163) executed in 1978; Prum Seang (TSA P150), wife of Sean An, killed in 1977; and
Meak Touch, DK Ambassador to Laos, arrested in 1977 and executed in 1978 (TSA M110).
Finally, I would also note that the diplomatic victims in all three categories include not only senior
personnel, i.e., ambassadors and their families, but also embassy staff such as cooks, secretaries and so
on; an example of this is Long Thach, who was a cook for pre-revolutionary Cambodian ambassadors to
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Korea and China (TSA L148), killed in 1978.
I do not have any kind of firm grip on the aggregate absolute numbers of victims involved in each
category, the relative numbers who obeyed the order to return, or the relative numbers of the returnees
who survived. Sorry about the lack of detail, but I hope this is helpful.” [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook 4 at Tab 70].
206

Id.
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the requisite nexus, then the Co-Prosecutor will not be able to indict those most responsible for
such acts. This is also true for attacks upon the property of foreign MSMs.
V.

PRACTICAL APPLICATION
This section, like the Elements section, acts on the assumption that violations of the

VCDR may entail individual criminal responsibility. This section assumes that such criminal
liability for VCDR violations formed part of customary international law prior to 17 April 1975.
Nevertheless, only two of the situations in full are violations of the VCDR, questions #1 and #4.
The second question is, in part, a violation of the VCDR. The third question is clearly not a
violation of the VCDR but such actions therein are violations of several customs and that will be
addressed.
A. Cambodia has been a party to the VCDR since 1965
Cambodia has been a Party to the VCDR since August 31, 1965. The numerous changes
in the governments of the State of Cambodia207 between 1970 and 1993 did not relieve it either
of its obligation to adhere to the stipulations of the VCDR or the consequences of such breaches
of diplomatic law. Government succession does not end a new government’s obligations to the
treaties, to which the former government(s) made the State a Party. This was the U.S. District
court’s conclusion in Jackson v. People’s Republic of China.208 Thus, any violations of the
VCDR, despite the government in power at the time, can be remedied as stipulated under the
VCDR Optional Protocol concerning the compulsory Settlement of Disputes.
B. Specific Questions from the ECCC Co-Prosecutor209

207

Email from Craig Etcheson (Oct 23, 2007, 13:09:26 EST), supra note 52. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook 4 at Tab 69].

208

Carter et al, supra note 53, at 449. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 29]. See also
Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ala. 1982). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 31].
209

Email from Alex Bates (Oct. 1, 2007), supra, fn. * [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 at Tab
68].
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Alex Bates, Co-Prosecutor to the Extraordinary Chambers asked that four specific
questions be addressed in addition to the general issue that the three previous sections addressed.
First, this memorandum will address whether each scenario presented is a violation of the
VCDR. Second, if the scenario constitutes a VCDR violation, then the memorandum will
address, assuming arguendo, that there will be individual criminal liability for such violations.
i. Foreign diplomats were protected from unreasonable detention under
the VCDR, as when the entire remaining diplomatic community was
confined to the French embassy for several weeks after 17 April 1975
Article 29 of the VCDR clearly sets out that the diplomatic agent is inviolable.210 A
diplomatic agent cannot be detained. Cases before the ICJ further evidence this fact. The United
States brought a case before the ICJ in United States v. Iran when Iranians took several members
of the U.S. diplomatic and consular staffs hostage. In Democratic Republic v. Congo,211 the ICJ
“determined that there was sufficient evidence to prove the existence of attacks by the DRC on
the Ugandan Embassy and the maltreatment of Ugandan diplomats by the DRC on diplomatic
premises at Ndjili Airport.”212 The ICJ went on to state that the maltreatment of the Ugandan
diplomats was a violation of Article 29 of the VCDR.213 At the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims
Tribunal, both States claimed violations of the VCDR against one another.214 Neither Ethiopia

210

VCDR, supra note 9, at art. 29. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 1].

“The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest
or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to
prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.” [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1]
211

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda)
(Judgment of Dec. 19, 2005). Available at www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/ico/ico_judgments/ico_judgment?20051219.pdf [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook 4 at Tab 55].

212

Lee M. Caplan, et al., supra note 167, at 292 – 93. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 at Tab
60].
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Id. at 293.
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Id. at 307.
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nor Eritrea severed diplomatic ties with the other but the state of war between them did not
permit the violations of the VCDR.215 Among the many claims of violations of the VCDR, the
Commission found that Eritrea had violated Article 22 of the VCDR “in its treatment of
Ethiopia’s Charge d’Affaires. The Commission found that Eritrea violated Article 29 of the
VCDR by arresting and briefly detaining the Charge, but determined that its brief questioning of
the Charge did not violate Articles 26 or 31.”216
Article 29 is not the only Article that this scenario violates. Those who detained the
diplomats at the French Embassy for several weeks following April 17, 1975 violated VCDR
Articles 26, 31, and 44. VCDR Article 26 allows for freedom of movement, with specific
exceptions.217 Detention, by its very nature, cannot allow freedom of movement. VCDR Article
31 states, “A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction” with
some exceptions to the immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction.218 Detention may
be equivalent to confinement. If this is the case, then such detention placed the diplomats under
the criminal and/or civil jurisdiction of the Khmer Rouge. This violated Article 31. Article 44
stipulates specific duties that the receiving State owes to those enjoying privileges and
immunities in reference to providing the necessary means for their departure from the receiving
State “at the earliest possible moment.”219 This stipulation is to be in force even during armed
215

Id. at 307.

216

Id. at 308.

217

VCDR, supra note 9, art 26 reads:

“Subject to its laws and regulations concerning zones entry into which is prohibited or regulated
for reasons of national security, the receiving State shall ensure to all members of the mission freedom
of movement and travel in its territory.” [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1]
218

Id. art 31 reads:

219

Id. art 44 reads:
“The receiving State must, even in case of armed conflict, grant facilities in order to enable
persons enjoying privileges and immunities, other than nationals of the receiving State, and members of
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conflicts.220 The actions by the Khmer Rouge breached this Article as well.
It is clear from at least one eyewitness to the conditions inside the French Embassy
following April 17, 1975 that there were indeed detentions of foreign MSMs, which the VCDR
granted protections.221 At the very least, the detention of foreign MSMs at the French Embassy
entailed violations of Article 29.
ii.

Are family members of diplomats protected, as in the cases where
Khmer spouses of foreign diplomats were ordered out [of] the
French embassy and never seen again?

Maybe. If the family members are neither nationals of nor permanent residents of the
receiving State, then the answer is yes depending on the specific status of the diplomatic agent
family member. Article 37 covers these privileges. Denza notes that the VCDR does not define
who constitutes the family of the diplomatic agent222 and that this is due to the different
conceptions of family between the delegates.223 However, Denza does point out that the United
States submitted an amendment to the Vienna Conference, which attracted a great deal of
support.224 In it, the United States defined family as:
“[a] member of the family is the spouse of a member of the mission, any minor
child or any other unmarried child who is a full-time student and any such other
members of the immediate family of a member of the mission as may be agreed
upon between the receiving and the sending States.”225
Denza also notes that the United States was willing to withdraw the provision: ‘or any other
the families of such persons irrespective of their nationality, to leave at the earliest possible moment. It
must, in particular, in case of need, place at their disposal the necessary means of transport for
themselves and their property.” [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1]
220

Id.
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London Times article, 11 May 1975, provided by Assistant Prosecutor Alex Bates, S 00003276,
D28598. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 at Tab 80]

222

Denza, supra note 5, at 322. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 21].
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Id.
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unmarried child who is a full time student.”226 Denza does note that while the US amendment
did not enter into the VCDR, it “has been accepted in general state practice.”227 This is
illuminating in light of the fact that the majority of States do not have formal rules pertaining to
who constitutes a family member.228
Some family members of MSMs receive fewer privileges and immunities based on the
diplomatic agent’s position at the missions. Regardless of the position of the person at the
mission, the family members receive the privileges and immunities in Articles 29 (inviolability
of the person), 30 (inviolability of residence and property), 31 (immunity from jurisdiction
giving evidence, execution), 32 (waiver of immunity by the sending State), and 33 (exemption
from social security provisions).229 Article 31.1 lists three situations under which a diplomatic
agent shall be exempt from the immunity from jurisdiction.230 None of these three situations
contravene the inviolability of the MSM’s person. Depending on the position of the MSM, the
family members of that person will receive the above immunities and privileges and additional
ones as Article 37 articulates.
Sometimes, family members of diplomatic agents are either permanent residents of or
nationals of the receiving State. If a family member of a MSM is a national of the receiving

226

Id.

227

Id. p. 323.

228

Id.

229

VCDR, supra note 9, art. 32. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 1].

230

Id. Article 31.1 reads:
“1.A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State.
He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
(a) A real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving
State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;
(b) An action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor,
administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State;
(c) An action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic
agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.”
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State, that family member does not receive the privileges and immunities the VCDR affords to
the members of the staff of the mission.231 The VCDR divides family members, who are
permanent residents of the receiving State, into two categories. If a permanent resident of the
receiving State is part of the household of a diplomatic agent, then that person will receive the
privileges and immunities commiserate with the diplomatic agent.232 If a permanent resident is a
family member of anyone forming the junior staff of the mission, then that family member does
not receive any of the privileges and immunities of the VCDR that the junior staff member
does.233
This section will consider the Khmer spouses of members of the staff of the mission as
being part of four distinct groups. The first group will be spouses who are neither permanent
residents of nor nationals of Cambodia but of Khmer origin. The second group will be Khmer
spouses of diplomatic agents and also permanent residents of but not nationals of Cambodia.
The third group will be Khmer spouses of junior staff members of the mission and also
permanent residents of but not nationals of Cambodia. The fourth group will be Khmer spouses
who are nationals of Cambodia.
The first group of spouses received all immunities and privileges that any other family
member would have commiserate to the position of the spouse, who is member of the staff of the
mission. Any action against a person, who was in this category, constituted a violation of the
VCDR. The second group is further split into two groups. Those spouses of diplomatic agents
received immunities and privileges that forbade their removal from the French Embassy. The
third group did not receive any immunities or privileges that their spouses did. The same is true
for the fourth group.
Any actions against the last two groups of spouses cannot constitute violations of the
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Denza, supra note 5, at 349. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 21].
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VCDR. While the ECCC may not be able to prosecute for the removal of Khmer spouses of
MSMs from the French Embassy, it may prosecute for subsequent actions against the Khmer
spouses if the 1956 Penal Code forbade those actions.234 If the Khmer Rouge ordered the spouse
out of the French Embassy and no one ever heard back from this person again, it is likely that
this person suffered some abuses that rise to the level of crimes against humanity such as murder,
imprisonment, torture, and persecution on political grounds. Therefore, while the ECCC cannot
prosecute on the grounds that such actions contravened the VCDR, the ECCC has the authority
to prosecute under Article 5.
Any actions against the first two groups of spouses that were violations of the VCDR
must meet the elements of specific crimes within the VCDR. These are listed in Annex I.
iii.

Are Cambodian diplomats protected, as when they were recalled
from abroad and ended up at S-21?

No. The VCDR makes no statement about the duty of the sending State to its own
diplomatic agents in regards to this query. Sending States have the right to revoke immunity
under Article 32 of the Convention,235 which was the case with Gueorgui Makharadze, the
Georgian diplomat to the United States who hit and killed a pedestrian while driving intoxicated
on 3 January 1997.236 Article 31 explicitly states, “The immunity of the diplomatic agent from
the jurisdiction of the receiving State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the sending
State.”237 However, there is no statement about what rights diplomats of the sending State have
when that state has taken a position towards them that is contrary to their rights as diplomats or
234

ECCC Statute, supra note 1, art. 2

235

Id., art. 32.

236

Kevin M. Gray, Envoy is Sentenced to Prison in Fatal Crash, New York Times, 20 December 1997.
Available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A06E1DB163EF933A15751C1A961958260&n=Top/R
eference/Times%20Topics/People/M/Makharadze,%20Gueorgui [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
4 at Tab 74].
237

VCDR, supra note 9, art. 33 ECCC Statute, supra note 1, [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at
Tab 1].
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even as civilian non-combatants because the right has traditionally vested with the state, not the
diplomat themselves. Abroad, the state can waive the immunity. In this case, there is no clear
indication that a remedy may even be possible under the VCDR even if violations of its
provisions did incur criminal liability. It would be best to seek criminal liability for such actions
against diplomatic agents under the Cambodian Penal Code of 1956, Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
Convention against Torture.
The ECCC has jurisdiction under Article 3 of the ECCC Statute to prosecute for
violations of the Cambodian Penal Code of 1956, which includes homicide, torture, and religious
persecution.238 As long as the crimes occurred 1) within the statute of limitations and 2) and
constitute one of the three categories, which Article 3 of the ECCC Statute sets out, then the
ECCC can prosecute for any such violations against returning diplomats.
Violations of Common Article 3 do not need a conflict nexus in order to incur individual
criminal liability. Common Article 3 prohibits physical harm, including murder, mutilation,
torture, and cruel treatment.239 It also proscribes taking hostages, outrages upon personal
dignity, and summary trials and executions without judicial guarantees.240 There can be no
conflict nexus requirement for crimes against humanity as the ICTY Appeal Chamber in
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction in the Tadić Trial
stated.241 The Appeal Chamber stated that such a nexus is obsolete and has been so since
1945.242
238

ECCC Statute, art. 3. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 at Tab 62].
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Id.
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Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 140. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 40].
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Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (Dec.
10, 1984) G.A. Res. 39/46. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 6].
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Cambodia did not become a Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) until 17 October 1980 and the United Nations Convention Against Torture did
open for signatures until 10 August 1984 and enter into force on 26 June 1987. Both of these
instruments proscribe numerous actions that individuals or State actors of the DK may have done
to returning diplomats. The Convention Against Torture defines torture in Article 1, Articles 2 –
4 proscribe torture for any reason and under any circumstance,243 Article 5 instructs States
Parties to the Convention Against Torture to establish jurisdiction to prosecute for acts of
torture.244 The ICCPR prohibits arbitrary deprivation of life (Article 6), torture (Article 7),
slavery (Article 8), imposition of punishment for crime which did not exist at time of offence
(Article 15), right to recognition before the law (Article 16), right to freedom of conscience,
thought, and religion (Article 18).245 Article 4 lists the rights contained in the aforementioned
Articles as non-derogable.246 Even though Cambodia was not a Party to the ICCPR prior or
during the period of the ECCC’s temporal jurisdiction, many of these rights overlap with the
rights contained in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and as jus cogens violations. If any such
action against a recalled diplomat to Cambodia under the DK regime occurred that constitutes a
violation of a jus cogens norm, then any nation has the right to prosecute for these crimes under
the notion of universal jurisdiction.
Jus cogens norms include but are not limited to genocide, torture, and slavery. The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) addresses this issue in Article 53 and 64.247 Article
53 provides that if treaties conflict with peremptory norms of general international law, they are
243

Id.
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Id. Article 5.
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (Dec. 16, 1966), G.A. Res. 220A (XXI).
Available at http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 7].
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Id. Article 4 also includes the rights listed under Articles 11 and 15 as non-derogable.

247

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 8].
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void. Article 53 also defines what jus cogens (or, peremptory norm) is: “a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character.”248 Article 64 provides that when a new peremptory
norm emerges, then any treaty that is in contravention to that new peremptory norm is void and
terminates.249
In conclusion, if a treaty to which Cambodia was a Party before 17 April 1975 or jus
cogens norm proscribes any action that someone may have taken against a recalled Cambodian
diplomatic agent within the jurisdiction of Cambodia, then the ECCC can prosecute that
individual or group of people responsible.
iv. Is the official and personal property of diplomats protected, as when
most or all embassies were breached after April 17th, and any
personal items not carried off to the French embassy was never seen
again a violation of the VCDR?
Yes. Article 22250 of the VCDR explicitly provides for the missions’ premises being
inviolable. While the receiving State’s obligation to protect this inviolability, whether premises,
documents, and/or archives, is a strict duty it is not an absolute one.251 “This is because the
capacity to provide protection varies from State to State; however, each receiving State must

248

Id. art 53.

249

Id. Article 64.

250

VCDR supra note 9, art. 22 reads:

1.The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them,
except with the consent of the head of the mission.
2.The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the
mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or
impairment of its dignity.
3.The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport
of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 1]
251

Charles Chatterjee, International Law and Diplomacy, p. 199. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
2 at Tab 44].
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demonstrate that it did its best with due care and skill to protect a foreign mission.”252 Article 30
provides for the inviolability of diplomatic agents’ residence and property:
1. The private residence of a diplomatic agent shall enjoy the same inviolability and
protection as the premises of the mission.
2. His papers, correspondence and, except as provided in paragraph 3 of Article 31, his
property, shall likewise enjoy inviolability.253
Thus, it appears that if a receiving State has a strict duty to provide protection of a foreign
mission with due care and skill and a diplomatic agent’s home is to be afforded the same level of
inviolability, then it follows that the receiving State has a strict duty in kind to the provisions
under Article 30. This protection must extend for a reasonable period of time after the mission
ceases operations. Chatterjee writes, “What is “reasonable period” in this context must be
determined by referring to the likelihood of it being used again”254 and that “archives and
documents of a mission must remain inviolable at all times whenever they may be.”
In Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo “was
held responsible for breaches of international law on diplomatic relations through the removal of
property and archives from the Ugandan Embassy.”255 The ICJ found that the Democratic
Republic of Congo “was liable to make reparations to Uganda for damages done.”256 The ICJ
stated that this action by the Democratic Republic of Congo was a violation of Article 22. This
demonstrates that removal of property from Embassies constitutes a violation of the VCDR.
Both Eritrea and Ethiopia had diplomatic claims before the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission,
before which both States claimed violations of the VCDR by the other State.257 The Commission
determined that Ethiopia violated the VCDR when its security guards “ransacked, searched and
252

Id.

253

VCDR, supra note 9, art. 30.

254

Charles Chatterjee, supra note 251, at 204. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 24].

255

Lee M. Caplan et al., supra note 167, at 293. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 at Tab 60].

256

Id.

257

Id. at 307.
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seized the Eritrean Embassy residence without Eritrea’s consent, in violation of Article 22 of the
VCDR.”258
In conclusion, the removal of property from an Embassy or residence of a protected
person under the VCDR is a violation of the VCDR. The cases above illustrate that. In order to
successfully prosecute for such violations against those most responsible for seizing official
and/or personal property of MSMs or of the mission, the Co-Prosecutor should refer to the
Elements specific to such crimes, which are listed in Annex I.

258

Id. at 308.
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ANNEX 1
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES OF
VIOLATIONS OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION
The elements in this table are, if possible, based on the ICC Statute’s Elements of Crimes

as PrepCom prepared.259 The corresponding crimes are divided based on the classification of the
crime committed. Article 8(2)(a) of the ICC Statute deals with grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.260 Article 8(2)(b) of the ICC Statute s deals with “other serious violations
of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict.261 Article 8(2)(c) of the ICC
Statute deals with Common Article 3 violations.262 Article 8(2)(e) of the ICC Statute covers
“other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an
international character.”263 For example, Articles 8(2)(b)(xiii) and Article 8(2)(e)(xii) covers the
war crime of destroying or seizing the enemy’s property. The difference between these two
crimes is that the former requires an international armed conflict nexus264 while the latter crime
must have a conflict nexus “not of an international character.”265
It is necessary to note that while the crimes and elements in this annex are based on war
crimes, the violations of the VCDR do not require a conflict nexus. The reason for specifically

259

Introduction to Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:
Sources and Commentary of Knut Dörmann, at xiii, xiv (2003). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at 2 and at Tab 28].

260

Knut Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:
Sources and Commentary 17 (2003). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at 2 and at Tab 28].
261

Id. at 128.

262

Id. at 382.

263

Id. at 439.

264

Id. at 249.

265

Id. at 485.

66

Colin Nisbet
War Crimes Lab Fall 2007
using war crimes under the ICC Statute and their respective elements is based on their
instructiveness in developing elements constituting violations of the VCDR.
II.

ELEMENTS
The elements in this Annex are an aid to the Co-Prosecutor to establish criminality of

acts, which contravene the VCDR.
A. Crimes against Mission Premises and Property not specific to the Articles of
the VCDR
Several Articles under the VCDR provide for what is protected in terms of physical
property whether it belongs to the mission of the receiving State or a MSM. Article 22 concerns
the inviolability of the Mission Premises.
1. Section 1(a): Crime against mission premises and property of
destruction and appropriation of property266
Elements
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct
2. The perpetrator destroyed or appropriated certain premises or property
2. The destruction or appropriation was extensive and carried out wantonly
3. Such premises and property were protected under the VCDR
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the protected status.

Explanation
These elements are applicable to general crimes against the property of the foreign
mission and against property of MSMs. Because these crimes are based on the Elements of the
Crime of the ICC Statute and the ICC Statute does not exclusively consider violations against
MSMs or foreign missions, some of the violations are outside the scope of the ICC Statute’s
Elements of Crimes. Where and when the Co-Prosecutor wants to indict a Suspect on a crime

266

Cf. ICC Elements of Crime art 8(2)(a)(iv): War Crime of destruction and appropriation of property 20
– 1. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook 4 and at Tab 67].
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against the protected property of the foreign mission and/or MSM and this section does not state
the elements of such a crime, then he may use the elements above as a guide for developing his
own if that is necessary.
2. Section 1(b): Crime of destruction and appropriation of
mission premises and property of the mission and/or the
member of staff of the mission (MSM)267
Elements
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct
2. The perpetrator destroyed or appropriated certain property.
3. The destruction or appropriation was not justified by military necessity.
4. The destruction or appropriation was extensive and carried out wantonly.
5. Such property was protected under the VCDR
6. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the protected status
3. Section 1(c): Crime against mission premises and property of
attacking objects belonging to the mission premises and
property of the mission and/or the member of staff of the
mission (MSM)268
Elements
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct
2. The perpetrator directed the attack.
3. The object of the attack was objects, not military in nature, that constituted part of the .
mission premises or property of the mission or the MSM.
4. Such objects of the attack were protected under the VCDR.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the protected status.
The Co-Prosecutor may use the elements of this specific crime when dealing with
situations specific to the actions of the Khmer Rouge when they attacked the French Embassy or

267

Cf. id.

268

Cf. id. at art 8(2)(b)(ii): War Crime of Attacking Civilian Objects, 23 – 4.
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any other premises that belonged to any foreign mission and/or property of MSMs. Specifically,
such a crime would be in contravention to VCDR Articles 22 and 30.
4. Section 1(d): Crime of excessive incidental damage to the
mission and/or the member of staff of the mission (MSM)269
Elements
1. The perpetrator carried out a State policy.
2. The carrying out of the policy was such that it would cause damage to property and that such
damage would be the reasonably foreseeable result of such a policy.
3. Such persons and property were protected under the VCDR.
4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the protected area.
5. Section 1(e): Crime of attacking undefended places protected
by the VCDR270
Elements
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct
2. The perpetrator attacked one or more dwellings or buildings belonging to the foreign mission
and/or the MSMs of the sending State.
3. Such dwellings or buildings were open for unresisted occupation.
4. Such dwellings or buildings were protected under the VCDR
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the property as protected
under the VDR.
6. Section 1(f): Crime of attacking objects protected by the
VCDR271
Elements
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct
2. The perpetrator directed an attack.
269

Cf. id. at art 8(2)(b)(iv): War crime of excessive incidental death, injury, or damage., 24 – 5.

270

Cf. id. at art 8(2)(b)(v): War crime of attacking undefended places, 25.

271

Cf. id. at art 8(2)(b)(ix): War crime of attacking protected objects, 28.
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3. The object of the attack was one or more buildings dedicated to the foreign mission or were
property of that mission or of MSMs of the sending State.
4. The perpetrator intended such building or buildings dedicated to diplomatic missions, property
of such missions, and/or of the MSMs of the sending State to be the object of the attack.
5. The objects of the attack were objects protected under the VCDR
6. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the objects as protected
under the VCDR.
7. Section 1(g): Crime of destroying or seizing property protected
by the VCDR272
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct
2. The perpetrator destroyed or seized certain property.
3. Such property was property protected by the VCDR
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the status of property
as protected under the VCDR.
8. Section 1(g): Crime of attacking objects using distinctive
emblems or flags or any other markings establishing it as a
diplomatic mission, which was protected by the VCDR273
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct
2. The perpetrator attacked one or more buildings or other objects, which were distinguished by
emblem or other another method of identification indicating protection under the VCDR.
3. The perpetrator intended such buildings or other objects so using such identification to be the
object of the attack.
4. The buildings or objects using such identification were protected under the VCDR.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established protection of such
buildings or objects under the VCDR.

272

Cf. id. at art 8(2)(b)(xiii): War crime of destroying or seizing the enemy’s property, 30 – 1.

273

Cf. id. at art 8(2)(b)(xxiv): War crime of attacking objects or persons using the distinctive emblems of
the Geneva Conventions, 36 – 7.
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B. Crimes against foreign MSMs’ property and mission premises specific to the
Articles of the VCDR
The crimes and elements listed in this section are based on specific VCDR Articles.
Article 24 covers the inviolability of the archives. Article 27.2 provides for the inviolability of
official correspondence while Articles 27.3 and 27.4 cover the inviolability of the diplomatic
bag. Article 30 concerns the inviolability of residence and property. Article 45 provide for the
duties of the receiving State to the protection of the interests of the sending State in case of a
breach of relations.
1. Section 1(a): Crime against inviolability of mission archives
Elements
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct.
2. The perpetrator violated the inviolability of the mission archives.
3. The perpetrator did not have the permission of the head of mission or the sending State to
enter the mission or to come into contact with the mission archives.
4. The mission archives were still protected by the VCDR at the time of the commission of the
crime by the perpetrator.
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the protected area.
2. Section 1(b): Crime against inviolability of official
correspondence
Elements
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct.
2. The perpetrator violated the inviolability of official correspondence
3. The correspondence was related to the mission and its functions
4. The perpetrator did not have the permission of the Head of Mission or the sending State to act
in such a manner as to equate to violating the official correspondence
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the protected area.
C. Crimes against the Inviolability of the MSM
1. Crimes against MSMs not specific to the Articles of the VCDR
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Article 29 provides the general basis for the inviolability of MSMs. However, there are
other articles which give more detailed protections and those are listed in the next section.
a. Crime of Murder/Willful Killing of VCDR protected
persons274
Elements
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct.
2. The perpetrator killed one or more persons.275
3. Such a person or persons were protected under the VCDR
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
b. Crime of imprisonment, detention, or other severe
deprivation of physical liberty of VCDR protected
persons276
Elements
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct.
2. The perpetrator imprisoned one or more persons or otherwise severely deprived one or more
persons of physical liberty.
3. Such a person or persons were protected under the VCDR
4. The gravity of the conduct was such that it was in violation of fundamental rules of
international law.
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the gravity of the
conduct.
c. Crime of torture of VCDR protected persons277
Elements
274

Cf. id. at art 7(1)(a): Crime against humanity of murder, 9; art 8(2)(a)(i): War Crime of willful killing,
18 – 9.

275

Cf. id. at fn. 7. “The term “killed” is interchangeable with the term “caused death.”

276

Cf. id. at art 7(1)(e), 11.

277

Cf. id. at art 7(1)(e), 11; at art 8(2)(a)(ii) – 1, 19.
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1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct.
2. The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon one or more persons
for such persons as: obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation, or coercion
or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.
3. Such person or persons were protected under the VCDR
4. Such pain or suffering did not arise only from, and was not inherent in or incidental to, lawful
sanctions.
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
d. Crime of rape of VCDR protected persons278
Elements
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct.
2. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however
slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the
anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body.
3. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by
fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such
person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was
committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent.
4. The person or persons suffering this crime were protected under the VCDR.
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
e. Crime of sexual violence against VCDR protected
persons279
Elements
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct.

278

Cf. id. at art 7(1)(g)-1, 12.

279

Cf. id. at art 7(1)(g)-6, 14 – 5.
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2. The perpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against one or more persons or caused
such person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or
abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a
coercive environment or such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent.
3. Such activity was of the gravity of the action comparable to the offense of rape of a VCDR
protected person.
4. The person or persons were protected under the VCDR.
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the gravity of the
conduct.
6. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the protected status of
the person(s).
f. Crime of persecution against VCDR protected
persons280
Elements
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct.
2. The perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law,281 one or more persons of
fundamental rights.
3. The perpetrator targeted such person or persons by reason of the identity of a group or
collectivity or targeted the group or collectivity as such.
4. Such targeting was based on the person or people’s status as an MSM or a family member of
the MSM.
5. Such person or persons were protected under the VCDR.
6. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the protected status of
280

Cf. id. at art 7(1)(h), 15.

281

Cf. id at fn. 21, “This requirement is without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the General Introduction to
the Elements of Crimes.” Paragraph 6 reads: “The requirement of “unlawfulness” found in the Statute or
in other parts of international law, in particular international humanitarian law, is generally not specified
in the elements of crimes.”
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the person.
g. Crime of enforced disappearance persons protected
under VCDR282
Elements
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct.
2. The perpetrator:
(a) Arrested, detained (including the act of maintaining a detention) or abducted one or
more persons; or
(b) Refused to acknowledge the arrest, detention or abduction, or to give information on
the fate or whereabouts of such person or persons.
2. (a) Such arrest, detention or abduction was followed or accompanied by a refusal to
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of
such person or persons; or
(b) Such refusal was preceded or accompanied by that deprivation of freedom.
3. The perpetrator was aware that:
(a) Such arrest, detention or abduction would be followed in the ordinary course of events
by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate
or whereabouts of such person or persons; or
(b) Such refusal was preceded or accompanied by that deprivation of freedom.
4. Such arrest, detention or abduction was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, a State or a political organization.
5. Such refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of such person or persons was carried out by, or with the authorization or support
of, such State or political organization.
6. The perpetrator intended to remove such person or persons from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.

282

Cf. id. at art 7(1)(i), 15 – 6.
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7. The person or persons who were victims of this crime were protected under the VCDR.
8. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the protected status of
the person or persons.
h. Crime of other inhumane acts against persons protected
under VCDR283
Elements
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct.
2. The perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical
health, by means of an inhumane act.
3. Such act was of a character (gravity) similar to any other act referred to in Article 7, paragraph
1, of the ICC Statute.
4. The person or persons who were victims of these crimes were protected under the VCDR.
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the character of the
act.
6. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the protected status of
the person or persons.
i. Crime of taking hostage persons protected under
VCDR284
Elements
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct.
2. The perpetrator seized, detained or otherwise held hostage one or more persons.
3. The perpetrator threatened to kill, injure or continue to detain such person or persons.
4. The perpetrator intended to compel a State, an international organization, a natural or legal
person or a group of persons to act or refrain from acting as an explicit or implicit condition for
the safety or the release of such person or persons.
5. Such person or persons were protected by the VCDR

283

Cf. id. at art 7(1)(k), 17.

284

Cf. id. at art 8(2)(c)(iii), 40.
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6. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established this status.
j. Crime of attacking persons protected under VCDR285
Elements
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct.
2. The perpetrator directed an attack.
3. The object of the attack was a person or persons protected under the VCDR.
4. The perpetrator intended the diplomats as such.
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established this status.
k. Crime of compelling participation in military
operations of persons protected under VCDR286
Elements
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct.
2.The perpetrator coerced one or more persons by act or threat to take part in military operations.
3. Such person or persons were protected under the VCDR.
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established this status.
D. Crimes against MSMs specific to the Articles of the VCDR
The crimes and elements listed in this section are based on specific VCDR Articles.
Article 26 provides for freedom of movement. Article 27.1 concerns freedom of communication.
Article 31.1 provides for immunity from jurisdiction. Article 31.3 provides for immunity from
execution. Article 35 provides for exemption from personal services. Article 36 provides for
exemption from customs, duties, and inspections.
1. Crime of denying freedom of movement to persons protected
under the VCDR
Elements
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct.

285

Cf. id. at art 8(2)(e)(i), 41.

286

Cf. id. at art 8(2)(b)(xv), 31.
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2. The perpetrator denied freedom of movement to a person or persons not permissibly
prohibited by provisions under Article 26 of the VCDR.
3. The person or persons were protected under the VCDR
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established this status.
2. Crime of denying freedom of movement to persons protected
under the VCDR
Elements
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct.
2. The perpetrator denied and/or did not protect free communication on the part of the person or
persons for all official purposes.
3. The persons or persons were protected under the VCDR.
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established this status.
3. Crime of denying freedom of movement to persons protected
under the VCDR
Elements
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct.
2. The perpetrator committed an action against a person or persons contrary to Article 31.3 of the
VCDR.
3. These actions were not of the nature enumerated in Article 31.1(a), (b), and/or (c).
4. The person or persons were diplomatic agents and protected under the VCDR.
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established this status.
4. Crime of not exempting from personal services persons
protected under the VCDR
Elements
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct.
2.The perpetrator coerced one or more persons by act or threat to take part in any public service
or military obligations whatsoever.
3. Such person or persons were diplomatic agents and protected under the VCDR.
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4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established this status.
5. Crime of not exempting from customs, duties, and inspection
diplomatic agents protected under the VCDR
Elements
1. The perpetrator was a State actor at the time of the conduct.
2. The perpetrator refused to exempt from customs, duties, and inspection a person or persons.
3. The person or persons were diplomatic agents and protected under the VCDR.
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the status.
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ANNEX 2
LIST OF MOST COMMON ABBREVIATIONS IN MEMORANDUM
CPPC – DA: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents
DK: Democratic Kampuchea
ECCC Statute: Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of
amendments as promulgated on 27 October 2004
ICC: International Criminal Court
ICC Statute: Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court
ICJ: International Court of Justice
ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTR: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
ILC: International Law Commission
MSM: Member of the Staff of the Mission
SCSL: Special Court for Sierra Leone
VCDR: Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
VCCR: Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
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